University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law

DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law
Faculty Scholarship

Francis King Carey School of Law Faculty

1997

The Religion Clauses and Freedom of Speech in Australia and the
United States: Incidental Restrictions and Generally Applicable
Laws
David S. Bogen
University of Maryland School of Law, dbogen@law.umaryland.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/fac_pubs
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the
International Law Commons

Digital Commons Citation
Bogen, David S., "The Religion Clauses and Freedom of Speech in Australia and the United States:
Incidental Restrictions and Generally Applicable Laws" (1997). Faculty Scholarship. 684.
https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/fac_pubs/684

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Francis King Carey School of Law Faculty at
DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

THE RELIGION CLAUSES AND FREEDOM OF
SPEECH IN AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED
STATES: INCIDENTAL RESTRICTIONS
AND GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAWS
DavidS. Bogen*
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.
II.

III.

IV.

V.

Introduction ....................................................................................... 54
Australian Constitutional Guarantees for Religion and Speech ....... 55
A. Section 116 of the Australian Constitution ................................ 57
B. The Implied Freedom of Political Discussion ............................ 63
1. The Implication of an Implied Freedom .............................. 64
2. 1997: Lange, Kruger, and Levy .......................................... 69
3. The Standards for Determining a Violation ........................ 75
a. The Legitimate Objective Test.. .................................... 75
b. Proportionality and the "Appropriate and
Adapted" Test ............................................................... 77
c. Deference ...................................................................... 80
4. Summary .............................................................................. 81
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution .................. 82
A. Free Exercise of Religion ........................................................... 82
1. The Cases ............................................................................ 83
2. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act ............................. 85
B. Establishment of Religion .......................................................... 85
C. Freedom of Speech .................................................................... 88
1. The Conflict in the Cases on Generally
Applicable Laws .................................................................. 88
2. The Relationship of American Indecision to Australia ....... 91
Generally Applicable Laws .............................................................. 92
A. The Case for Generally Applicable Laws .................................. 92
B. The Weaknesses of Immunity for Generally
Applicable Laws ........................................................................ 94
Conclusion ........................................................................................ 95

* Associate Dean, Professor and T. Carroll Brown Scholar, University of Maryland
School of Law. B.A., 1962, LL.B., 1965, Harvard University; LL.M., 1967, N.Y.U. Law School.
My thanks to my research assistants, Harry Malone and Scott McCabe, University of Maryland
School of Law Class of '98, my colleagues William Reynolds and Greg Young, George Winterton
of the University of New South Wales, and George Williams of the Australian National University
for saving me from the most egregious of errors.

53
HeinOnline -- 46 Drake L. Rev. 53 1997-1998

54

Drake Law Review

[Vol. 46

I. INTRODUCfiON

Both Australia and the United States have constitutional protections against
the establishment of religion and for freedom of both religion and speech. The
First Amendment protects these freedoms in the United States. 1 Sectio~ 116 of
the Australian Constitution contains similar clauses on religion, but has no free
speech clause.2 Nevertheless, the High Court of Australia found that freedom of
communication on matters of government and politics was implicit in the
constitutional provisions on voting for federal offices and constitutional
referenda. 3
The Australian High Court makes the purpose of a law of central importance in determining whether the law is an unconstitutional violation of the
protections for religion and speech. 4 The United States Supreme Court is less
explicit, but recent decisions have also made purpose important to its First
Amendment analysis. 5 Sometimes purpose is expressly considered; at other
times a concern with purpose motivates the Supreme Court's adoption of a
doctrine. Purpose, in this sense, is neither the subjective motives of legislators
voting for a measure nor the measure's likely objective effects. It is a construct
of the law's goal derived from the likely effects of the measure, common human
experience with respect to the likelihood that such effects would be desired by
legislators or would be sought by such means in the context in which the law was
adopted, supported with evidence for the law's context that may include
statements of those involved in the process.
Concern with purpose explains the judicial treatment of generally applicable laws which regulate behavior that is not ordinarily engaged in for religious or
expressive reasons. The restriction of religion or speech is not likely to be the
purpose of the generally applicable law. Any restriction incidental to a law of
general application will receive less scrutiny than limitations in laws focused on
speech or religious activities. 6 Some courts even say that generally applicable
laws pose no constitutional issue at all.
This Article describes Australian constitutional law with respect to religion
and freedom of political discussion. A major theme of the handful of Australian
High Court cases dealing with this issue has been the importance of determining
the purpose or objective of the law. As part of this process, the Australian courts
use the concept of proportionality. The High Court has deferred to the legislature, and it has begun to circumscribe the scope of constitutional protections for
l. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2 See AUSlL. CONST. ch. V, § 116.
3. Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth (ACTV) (Austl. 1992) 177
C.L.R. 106, 110-11 (Mason, C.J.).
4. See id. at 240 (McHugh, J.).
5. See generally Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of
Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (1996).
6. See generally Michael C. Dorf,lncidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV.
L. REv. 1175, 1201 (1996) (analyzing the limiting principles developed by the Supreme Court in
treating incidental burdens as infringements on fundamental constitutional rights to engage in
primary conduct).
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free speech. It may even borrow from conflicting United States precedents, and
exempt generally applicable laws from constitutional scrutiny with a presumption
that any impact on constitutionally protected religion or speech is incidental to
legitimate purposes. This Article concludes by analyzing the arguments for
treating generally applicable laws as immune from constitutional scrutiny, and
suggests it is a bad idea.
Australia and the United States each could profitably consider elements of
the approach taken by the courts of the other nation to carefully scrutinize even
generally applicable laws for their lack of proportion. The United States' experience with its religion clauses should make Australian courts wary of immunizing
generally applicable laws from review under Section 116 of the Australian Constitution. Similarly, the Australian insistence on proportionality to uncover
improper purpose in political discussion cases provides a helpful note of caution
for United States courts faced with free speech challenges to generally applicable
laws.

II.

AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL GuARANTEES FOR RELIGION AND SPEECH

The Australian High Court traditionally approaches the relationship
between the powers granted the central government and the limitations on those
powers quite differently than the United States Supreme Court. The High
Court's opinions focus on characterization-whether the law should be characterized as one ''with respect to" a Commonwealth power. 7 The High Court is
more skeptical than its United States counterpart of claims that an act is within
the general powers of the central government. For example, the United States
Supreme Court found the commerce clause'! permitted federal regulation of the
amount of home grown wheat a farmer could consume because it substantially
affected interstate commerce.9 In contrast, the Australian High Court held that
the similar Australian trade and commerce clause1o did not authorize government
operation of air service between two points in the same state even though such
service was arguably necessary to make the concurrent service between the state
·
and the Northern Territory economically viable. 11

7. See Leslie Zines, Characterisation of Commonwealth Laws, in AUSTRALIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECfiVES 33 (H.P. Lee & George Winterton eds., 1992).
8. 'The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
9. Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). The decision of Wickard was reaffirmed in a recent case that limited the reach of the commerce power. See United States v. Lopez,
115 S. Ct. 1624, 1630 (1995).
10. 'The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the
peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to: (i) Trade and commerce
with other countries, and among the States." AUSTL. CONST. ch. I, pt. V, § 51(i).
11. Attorney-General ex rel Ansett Transp. Indus. Pty. Ltd. v. Australian Nat'l Airlines
Comm'n (Austl. 1976) 138 C.L.R. 492, 508 (Stephen, J.).
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Until recently, the Australian High Court's careful scrutiny of whether an
act is within a grant of power was matched by its reluctance to give substantial
content to the affirmative restrictions on power. 12 The High Court paid less
attention to specific limitations on the granted powers in part because the
founders of the Australian Constitution clearly repudiated the American-style
Bill of Rights. 13 Nevertheless, the Australian Constitution does protect some
individual rights. 14 The High Court revitalized several of these affirmative
restrictions during the past several years and has even, within limits, implied new
ones. 15

12 Peter Hanks, Constitutional Guarantees, in AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL
PERSPEcriVES, supra note 7, at 92-95.
13. The High Court stated:
[l]t is difficult, if not impossible, to establish a foundation for the implication of general guarantees of fundamental rights and freedoms. To make such
an implication would run counter to the prevailing sentiment of the framers that
there was no need to incorporate a comprehensive Bill of Rights in order to
protect the rights and freedoms of citizens. That sentiment was one of the
unexpressed assumptions on which the Constitution was drafted.
Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1992) 177 C.L.R. 106, 136
(Mason, C.J.). One commentator stated, "The framers of the Australian Constitution were not prepared to place fetters upon legislative action, except and in so far as it might be necessary for the
purpose of distributing between the State and the central Government the full extent of legislative
power." Sir Owen Dixon, Speech to the American Bar Association in August /944, in JESTING
PILATE AND OTHER PAPERS AND ADDRESSES 101-02 (1965). Instead, "responsible government in a
democracy is regarded by us as the ultimate guarantee of justice and individual rights." SIR
ROBERT MENZIES, CENTRAL POWER IN THE AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH 54 ( 1967).
14. See N.K.F. O'Neill, Constitutional Human Rights in Australia, 17 FED. L. REv. 85, 85
(1987). For example, section 41 provides rights .of electors of a state. /d. at 86. Section 51 xxxi
permits the federal government to appropriate land but only on fair terms-the equivalent of the
taking clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. /d. at 86-88. Section 80
provides for trial by jury. /d. at 88. Section 92 speaks in broad terms of freedom of interstate trade,
commerce and intercourse. /d. at 98. Section 117 is the equivalent of the privileges and
immunities clause of Article IV of the United States Constitution. /d. at 112-13.
15. See, e.g., Cheatle v. Regina (Austl. 1993) 177 C.L.R. 541, 559 (Lathan, C.J.) (requiring
a unanimous verdict in jury cases); Dietrich v. Regina (Austl. 1992) 177 C.L.R. 292, 299 (Mason,
C.J. and McHugh, J.) (requiring counsel for fair trial); Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v.
Commonwealth, 177 C.L.R. at 134 (Mason, C.J.) (implying freedom of political discussion from
the Constitution); Street v. Queensland Bar Ass'n (Austl. 1989) 168 C.L.R. 461,493 (Mason, C.J.)
(stating that Section 117 applies to forbid a residence requirement for membership in the bar,
including the requirement that an attorney must practice primarily in Queensland, because it
operated discriminatorily using reasonably proportionate type of analysis); see also GEOFFREY LINDELL, Recent Developments in Constitutional Interpretation, in FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN AUSTRALIAN
CONSTmmONALLAW 1, 1 (1994) [hereinafter FUTURE DIRECfiONS]; Peter Bailey, "Righting" the
Constitution Without a Bill of Rights, 23 FED. L. REV. 1 (1995) (surveying a series of twelve cases
"curbing the power of the executive" and "focus[ing] on the protection of the rights of
individuals").
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The religion clauses in the Australian Constitution prohibit laws "for
establishing any religion . . . or for prohibiting the free exercise of any
religion." 16 This language has been a major factor in making the "purpose" of a
challenged law determinative of its constitutionality. The centrality of purpose in
the religion clauses has similarities to the High Court's approach to the new
implied freedom of political discussion. In the freedom of political discussion
cases, the High Court has tested the purpose of the law by its proportionality as a
measure to implement a proper governmental interestP Nevertheless, the latest
decisions display considerable deference toward the legislature in applying the
constitutional standard and suggest some retreat from a broad view of the
protected right. IS
A. Section 116 of the Australian Constitution

Section 116 of the Australian Constitution initially appears quite similar to
the religion clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." 19 Section 116
provides: "The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any
religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free
exercise of any religion, and no religious test shall be required as a qualification
for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth."2:l
There are major differences, however, in the subsequent development of
the constitutional provisions of the two nations. The First Amendment has been
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, 21 and its religious
clauses have been the subject of much litigation. 22 By contrast, section 116

16. AUSTI... CONST.ch. V, § 116.
17. Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth, 177 C.L.R. at 143-44
(Mason, C.J.).
18. See, e.g., Langer v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1996) 134 A.L.R. 400, 405-06 (Brennan,
C.J.) ("[l]f the impairment of the freedom is reasonably capable of being regarded as appropriate
and adapted to the achieving of a legitimate legislative purpose and the impairment is merely
incidental to the achievement of that purpose, the law is within power.").
19. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
20. AUSTI... CONST. ch. V, § 116.
21. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). The Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution protects the free exercise of religion from deprivation by state
governments acting without due process. /d. That protection incorporates the same standards as
the First Amendment's protection of free exercise against federal government prohibitions. /d.
22 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531
(1993) (examining free exercise of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment); Jesse H. Choper,
The Free Exercise Clause: A Structural Overview and an Appraisal of Recent Developments, 27
WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 944-45 (1985-86) (describing the strict scrutiny test of constitutionality
as applied to religious liberty); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
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applies only to the Commonwealth,23 and the High Court has never found a
violation. 24
One reason for the absence of section 116 litigation has been that the
precedents are not promising for those who would attack commonwealth laws.
The cases support a purpose-centered interpretation of section 116 which tends to
uphold generally applicable laws that do not target religion. The High Court's
latest decision reaffirmed the centrality of purpose to section 116, but left open,
to some degree, the methodology to be used in determining purpose in such
cases. 25
The High Court has consistently held that section 116 is not violated unless
the purpose-of the challenged law is to establish religion or prohibit its free exercise.26 The High Court recently reaffirmed the centrality of purpose as the
touchstone for constitutionality under section 116 in Kruger v. Commonwealth.Zl
The decision, however, did not entirely resolve how the Court should determine
purpose.
The Kruger decision involved a suit brought by the so-called "stolen generation,"28 children who had been removed from their homes pursuant to the
Aboriginals Ordinance of 1918, and one of the mothers whose children had been
taken. 19 Section 7 of the Ordinance made the Chief Protector of the Aboriginals
the legal guardian of all aboriginal and half-caste children.30 Section 6 authorized him to take custody of the children if, in his opinion, it was necessary or
desirable in the interests of the child to do so; section 16 allowed him to keep any
Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1109, 1110 (1990) (discussing that free exercise does not relieve an
individual of complying with a "valid and neutral law of general applicability").
23. ENID CAMPBELL & HARRY WHITMORE, FREEDOM IN AUSTRALIA 377 (1973).
24. See infra note 26 and accompanying text. It should be noted that only one of the High
Court's four decisions occurred within the past fifteen years.
25. See Kruger v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1997) 146 A.L.R. 126, 153-54 (Dawson, J .).
26. See Attorney-General ex rei Black v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1981) 146 C.L.R. 559,
604 (Gibbs, J.) (stating that a law that provides financial aid to a church-related school does not
violate the establishment clause as long as its purpose is not to recognize it as a national institution); Adelaide Co. v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1943) 67 C.L.R. 116, 149 (Rich, J.) (stating that
regulations preventing the dissemination of principles subversive to the Commonwealth do not
infringe on section 116); Krygger v. Williams (Austl. 1912) 15 C.L.R. 366, 370 (Griffith, C.J.)
(stating that compulsory military training is not a violation of the free exercise of religion); see also
Stephen McLeish, Making Sense of Religion and the Constitution: A Fresh Start for Section I 16,
18 MONASHU. L. REV. 207, 210(1992).
27. Kruger v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1997) 146 A.L.R. 126. Justice McHugh did not
reach this issue because he found that Section 116 did not apply to laws governing the territory. ld.
at 218 (McHugh, J.).
28. Thorpe v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1997) 144 A.L.R. 677,694 (Kirby, J.) (holding that
suit for declaration dismissed for want of jurisdiction).
29. Kruger v. Commonwealth, 146 A.L.R. at 132 (Brennan, C.J.). The Governor General
promulgated the Ordinance in 1918 and amended it from time to time pursuant to powers conferred
by section 7(3) of the Northern Territory Acceptance Act of 1910 and by section 13 of the Northern
Territory (Administration) Act of 1910. /d.
30. /d. at 133.
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aboriginal or half-caste within the boundaries of a reservation or in an aboriginal
institution.31 Regulations to carry out the Ordinance gave Protectors the discretion to send any aboriginal or half-caste children to the nearest aboriginal
institution or school. 32 Although Australians have regarded the practice of
enforced separations as unacceptable for decades, the affected individuals had no
recourse for the harm done. 33 In 1997, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission engaged in an inquiry and made a report on the full extent and
impact of these policies.34 The political climate surrounding the inquiry, the
development of implied freedoms, and the expansive interpretation of other limits on government by the High Court emboldened these plaintiffs to sue. 35 A
critical part of their claim was that the Ordinance was unconstitutional36 and that
such a constitutional violation gave rise to an individual cause of action. 37 Section 122 of the Australian Constitution, however, gives Parliament plenary power
to make laws for the territory. 38 Thus, the plaintiffs' argument focused primarily
on the claim that the Ordinance violated a limit on governmental power. 39 The
only express limit they cited was Section 116. 40 The plaintiffs claimed that
removal from an aboriginal community separated the child from his or her
culture and system of beliefs, thereby impairing the free exercise of religion. 41
31. /d. at 133-34.
32 /d. at 134 (citing Regulations (General) under section 3 of the Aboriginals Ordinance
of 1918 and section 6 of the Aboriginal Regulations of 1933).
33. /d. at 134-35.
34. HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, BRINGING THEM HOME:
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INQUIRY INTO THE SEPARATION OF ABORIGINAL AND TORRES STRAIT
ISLANDER CHILDREN FROM THEIR FAMILIES (1997). For an affecting story of the impact of this
policy on an individual, see SALLY MORGAN, MY PLACE (1987).
35. Kruger v. Commonwealth, 146 A.L.R. at 136 (Brennan, C.J.).
36. /d.
37. /d. at 142.
38. Section 122 states:
The Parliament may make laws for the government of any territory surrendered
by any State to and accepted by the Commonwealth, or of any Territory placed
by the Queen under the authority of and accepted by the Commonwealth, or
otherwise acquired by the Commonwealth, and may allow the representation of
such territory in either House of the Parliament to the extent and on the terms
which it thinks fit.
AUSTL. CONST. ch. VI. § 122; see also Australian Nat'! Airways Ry. Ltd. v. Commonwealth
(Austl. 1945) 71 C.L.R. 29 (discussing plenary character of the power).
39. Kruger v. Commonwealth, 146 A.L.R. at 173-74 (Toohey, J.).
40. /d. at 173.
41. /d. at 173-74. The relationship of indigenous groups to the land has an important
religious dimension. See Nonie Sharp, No Ordinary Case: Reflections Upon Mabo (No 2), 15
SYD. L. REv. 143, 151 (1993). Nevertheless, the heated debates on the topic have not involved
section 116. Clashes over aboriginal land rights have often been at the state level where section
116 does not apply. The most significant development to date was the decision in Mabo v. Quee~
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The questions referred to the High Court included whether the power to enact
laws, ordinances, and regulations for the territory was so restricted by any
claimed limitations including section 116 as to invalidate them. 42
Five justices held that section 116 did not invalidate the Ordinance and
regulations, 43 while the sixth insisted that the record was not sufficient to make
the determination. 44 Chief Justice Gerard Brennan stated that none of the laws as
properly construed could be seen as a law for prohibiting the free exercise of
religion because they did not appear to have a forbidden purpose.45 Even if
individual "protectors" had taken children from their parents for the purpose of
interfering with religious exercise, that would be an abuse of power rather than a
ground for setting aside the regulations.46 Justice William Gummow stated that
the question was "whether the Commonwealth has made a law in order to
prohibit the free exercise of any religion, as the end to be achieved," 47 and Justice
Daryl Dawson agreed with him on this point. 48 Justice Gummow concluded that
even though the law might have the effect of denying the children instruction in
the religious beliefs of their community: "there is nothing apparent in. the 1918
Ordinance which suggests that it aptly is to be characterised as a law made in
order to prohibit the free exercise of any such religion, as the objective to be
achieved by the implementation of the law."49 Justice Toohey agreed that the
language of the 1918 Ordinance did not disclose any forbidden purpose, and the
High Court should state it did not violate section 116.~ Only Justice Mary
Gaudron thought that the Ordinance might disclose a forbidden purpose on its
stand (Austl. 1992) 175 C.L.R. 1. Prior to this case, it was generally accepted that the doctrine of
terra nullius applied to Australia-that all law proceeded from the Crown. /d. at 26-27 (Brennan,
J.). The High Court rejected this doctrine, finding that another legal system coexisted with crown
sovereignty. /d. at 34. While Crown grants were recognized as extinguishing native title in crown
courts, however unjust those actions might be, native title remained in lands that had not received a
positive grant. /d.
42 Kruger v. Commonwealth, 146 A.L.R. at 173 (Toohey, J.). The proceedings followed
section 18 of the Judiciary Act of 1903 which allows a member of the High Court sitting alone to
reserve any question for consideration of the Full Court. Judiciary Act of 1903, § 18 (Austl.). The
Chief Justice reserved the questions in this case on the basis that they do not call for any ascertainment of facts which require submission of evidence. Kruger v. Commonwealth, 146 A.L.R. at 137
(Brennan, C.J .).
43. See Kruger v. Commonwealth, 146 A.L.R. at 138 (Brennan, C.J.), 153 (Dawson, J.),
173-74 (Toohey, J.), 218-20 (McHugh, J.), 232 (Gummow, J.).
44. /d. at 212 (Gaudron, J.).
45. /d. at 138 (Brennan, C.J.).
46. /d. at 135-36.
47. /d. at 232-33 (Gummow, J.).
48. /d. at 153 (Dawson, J.). Justice Dawson also argued that section 116 was inapplicable
to this case because it did not restrict the Commonwealth's power over the territories. /d. Justice
McHugh agreed with him on this point. /d. at 218 (McHugh, J.). However, Justices Gummow, id.
at 232 (Gummow, J.), Toohey, id. at 173 (Toohey, J.), and Gaudron, id. at 202-03 (Gaudron, J.)
stated that section 116 did restrict section 122.
49. /d. at 233 (Gummow, J.).
50. /d. at 173-74 (Toohey, J.).
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face. 51 Given the effect of the law, Justice Gaudron argued that preventing
participation of the children in religious practices that were part of the
community activities might appear to be a purpose of the Ordinance. 52
Justices Toohey and Gummow intimated that a law that was constitutional
on its face might be challenged with evidence that it was a "circuitous device" to
attain a forbidden end, but held that such a challenge was not appropriate in the
posture of the case before them. 53 They did not discuss what evidence they
would accept or what standard would be applicable if the issue were properly
presented. Justice Gummow did state, however, that "a law which protects or
regulates the personal or property rights of others will not ordinarily offend
[section] 116, despite curtailment by the general operation of that law of overt
activity which in respect of some persons may give expression to their religious
beliefs." 54 Justice Gummow supported this statement by citing to Employment
Division v. Smith, 55 a United States case which stated that generally applicable
laws are not subject to the free exercise clause of the First Amendment.56
While other justices considered the law to be religiously neutral on its face,
Justice Gaudron derived purpose from its effect. 57 Because the effect on religion
could have been the purpose of the law, Justice Gaudron argued that the Commonwealth could avoid section 116 only by pleading that the law was necessary
to attain some overriding public purpose or that it was for a specific purpose
unconnected with the free exercise of religion and only incidentally affected that
freedom. 58 If the Commonwealth did so, "a question might arise, if the plea were
to be made good, whether the interference with religious freedom, if any,
effected by the Ordinance was appropriate and adapted or, which is the same
thing, proportionate to the protection and preservation of those people. " 59
In sum, section 116 invalidates laws only when they are enacted with a
forbidden purpose. But these cases do not resolve how a court determines
whether a forbidden purpose exists. On the one hand, the High Court might find
that a law which impairs free exercise without sufficient justification is
"discriminatory," despite its apparent generality, and, therefore, has a forbidden
"purpose." The same could be true of a law challenged as an "establishment." In
cases decided under section 92 00 and· section 117,61 the High Court found
/d. at 208-09 (Gaudron, J.).
/d. at 211.
/d. at 173 (Toohey, J.), 233 (Gummow, J.).
/d. at 232 (Gummow, J.).
55. Employment Div. v. Smith, 484 U.S. 872 (1990).
56. Kruger v. Commonwealth, 146 A.L.R. at 232 n.46l (Gummow, J.) (citing
Employment Div. v. Smith, 484 U.S. at 878-80).
57. /d. at 207 (Gaudron, J.).
58. /d. at 211.
59. /d. at 212.
60. In Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd. v. South Australia, the High Court invalidated a fee
imposed on nonrefillable bottles. Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd. v. South Australia (Austl. 1990) 169
C.L.R. 436, 477 (Mason, C.J., joined by Brennan, Deane, Dawson, and Toohey, JJ.). Noting that
51.
52.
53.
54.

HeinOnline -- 46 Drake L. Rev. 61 1997-1998

62

Drake Law Review

[Vol. 46

discrimination existed because facially neutral laws had a differential impact.
Applying section 116 in Kruger, Justice Gaudron inferred purpose from effect,
even though the law was not triggered by religion.62 Justice Gaudron would use
proportionality to test such a law.63
On the other hand, prior decisions upheld generally applicable laws with
comments that suggested that they did not pose a serious threat to section 116. 64
Most of the justices in Kruger looked to the religiously neutral appearance of the
law in upholding it.65 Although the High Court might be willing to look behind
the surface where a law impacts religion significantly with little justification and
the surrounding discussion evinces a motive of establishment or suppression of
religion, the search for purpose would begin with a strong presumption in the
law's favor. In Kruger, Justice Gummow's reference to Smith supports the
proposition that section 116 decisions may uphold generally applicable laws
without carefully scrutinizing them. 66

intrastate bottlers used refillable bottles, the High Court saw a substantial differential impact as a
result of the state law. /d. at 475-76. In analyzing the basis for the law, the High Court noted that
no significant differential fee between refillable and nonrefillable bottles was needed to encourage
consumers to return bottles. /d. at 476. The only justification for a discriminatory fee was to
discourage the use of nonrefillable bottles. /d. at 474. The energy and environmental costs of such
bottles, however, were largely borne by other states where the bottles were made. /d. at 476. As a
result, the High Court held that the fee was not reasonably proportionate to the legitimate bases for
state action. /d. at 477.
61. In Street v. Queensland Bar Ass'n, the High Court invalidated a requirement that
Queensland bar members not practice elsewhere, noting that the provision had a differential impact
on nonresidents. Street v. Queensland Bar Ass'n (Austl. 1989) 168 C.L.R. 461, 589-90 (McHugh,
J.).
.
62 Kruger v. Commonwealth, 146 A.L.R. at 207 (Gaudron, J.).
63. /d.
64. For instance, Krygger v. Williams involved a law of general applicability, and the High
Court saw no problem with its impact on religion. Krygger v. Williams (Austl. 1912) 15 C.L.R.
366, 371-72 (Barton, J.). Closer scrutiny was given in Adelaide Co. v. Commonwealth because the
law required examination of the religion's teachings. The Governor-General's decision was
directed at a particular religious group, and its effect was devastating to the sect. Adelaide Co. v.
Commonwealth (Austl. 1943) 67 C.L.R. 116, 134-35 (Latham, C.J.). Nevertheless, the High Court
decided that section 116 was not violated. /d. at 131-32. The law supported the conduct of the
war, and the religious motivation for opposition was irrelevant to the decision to suppress it. /d. at
132-33. The justices in Attorney-General ex rel. Black v. Commonwealth did not examine the
impact of the grant on religious schools, but nevertheless upheld them. Attorney General ex rel.
Black v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1981) 146 C.L.R. 559.
65. See Kruger v. Commonwealth, 146 A.L.R. at 153 (Brennan, C.J.), 173 (Toohey, J.),
233 (Gummow, J.).
66. See id. at 233 (Gummow, J.) (citing Employment Div. v. Smith, 484 U.S. 872, 878-80
(1990)).
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B. The Implied Freedom of Political Discussion
The Australian Constitution does not have a First Amendment style clause
that protects speech. The framers considered the American model, but omitted
any reference to freedom of speech. 61 As a result, the High Court's implication
of a constitutional protection for political discussion in the absence of an express
guarantee generated a great deal of discussion. 68
Since 1992, an implied freedom of political discussion has become a permanent part of the Australian constitutional landscape. As with religious
freedom, the High Court's standard for constitutionality focuses on the law's
objective. 69 Under the rubric of determining whether a law is "appropriate and
adapted" to a valid objective, the High Court scrutinizes the proportionality of a
challenged law as a means to implement legitimate government interests.'lll The
High Court seems likely to apply that standard to generally applicable laws as
well, while granting substantial deference to the legislature.
67. Michael Stokes, Constitutional Commitments not Original Intentions: Interpretation
in the Freedom of Speech Cases, 16 SYDNEY L. REV. 250, 254-55 (1994).
68. See generally A.R. Blackshield, The Implied Freedom of Communication, in FuTuRE
DIREcriONS, supra note 15, at 232-35; Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Implications in Language, Law and
the Constitution, in FuTuRE DIREcriONS supra note 15, at 150; Gabriel A. Moens, The Wrongs of a
Constitutionally Entrenched Bill of Rights, in AUSTRALIA: REPUBLIC OR MONARCHY 233 (M.A.
Stephenson & Clive Turner eds., 1994); Symposium: Constitutional Rights for Australia?, 16
SYDNEY L. REv. 145 (1994); Gerard Carney, The Implied Freedom of Political Discussion-Its
Impact on State Constitutions, 23 FED. L. REV. 180 (1995); Deborah Z. Cass,Through the Looking
Glass: The High Court and the Right to Speech, 4 PuB. L. REV. 229 (1993); Peter Creighton, The
Implied Guarantee of Free Political Communication, 23 U. WEST. Ausn.. L. REV. 163 (1993);
Neil F. Douglas, Freedom of Expression Under the Australian Constitution, 16 U. NEW S. WALEs
L.J. 315 (1993); J.J. Doyle, Constitutional Law: "At the Eye of the Storm," 23U. WEST. AUSTL. L.
REV. 15 (1993); Arthur Glass, Australian Cap.ital Television and the Application of Constitutional
Rights, 17 SYDNEY L. REV. 29 (1995); Timothy H. Jones, Legal Protection for Fundamental Rights
and Freedoms: European Lessons for Australia, 22 FED. L. REV. 57 (1994); Geoffrey Kennett,
Individual Rights, the High Court and the Constitution, 19 MELB. U. L. REV. 581 (1994); Jeremy
Kirk, Constitutional Implications from Representative Democracy, 23 FED. L. REV. 37 (1995);
Leighton McDonald, The Denizens of Democracy: The High Court and the "Free Speech" Cases,
5 PuB. L. REV. 160 (1994); Robert M. O'Neil, Freedom of Expression and Public Affairs in
Australia and the United States: Does a Written Bill of Rights Really Matter, 22 FED. L. REV. 1
(1994); D.A. Smallbone, Recent Suggestions of an Implied "Bill of Rights" in the Constitution,
Considered as Part of a General Trend in Constitutional Interpretation, 21 FED. L. REV. 254
(1993); Donald Speagle, Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth, 18 MELB. U. L.
REV. 938 (1992); Sally Walker,The Impact of the High Court's Free Speech Cases on Defamation
Law, 17 SYDNEY L. REv. 43 (1995); George Williams, Civil Liberties and the Constitution-A
Question of Interpretation, 5 PuB. L. REV. 82 (1994); George Williams, Engineers is Dead, Long
Live the Engineers!, 17 SYDNEY L. REV. 62 (1995).
69. Blackshield, supra note 68, at 251.
70. /d.
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The Implication of an Implied Freedom

Australian Courts have long followed the English principle that "a court
will interpret laws of the Parliament in light of a presumption that the Parliament
does not intend to abrogate human rights and fundamental freedoms." 71 High
Court members have also considered fundamental freedoms in determining
whether a law could be justified as incidental to a power granted to the commonwealth government. n Despite the influence that such background freedoms
have had on the interpretation of the laws, and even on determining whether they
were enacted as a means of carrying out a granted power, they do not prevent the
legislature from validly enacting a law pursuant to an express grant of power
even if the law's purpose was to impair a fundamental common-law value.
In 1992, the High Court took the next step, deciding that freedom of political discussion is implicit in the Constitution and directly limits legislative action
even under express grants of power. In Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v. Wills ,13 the
High Court unanimously invalidated a commonwealth law prohibiting criticism

71. See In re Bolton (Austl. 1987) 162 C.L.R. 514, 523 (Brennan, J.); Potter v. Minahan
(Austl. 1908) 7 C.L.R. 277, 304 (O'Connor, J.). Justice Brennan also stated, 'but the court cannot
deny the validity of an exercise of a legislative power expressly granted merely on the ground that
the law abrogates human rights and fundamental freedoms or trenches upon political rights which,
in the court's opinion, should be preserved." Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v. Wills (Austl. 1992) 177
C.L.R. 1, 43 (Brennan, J.); see also Bropho v. Western Australia. (Austl. 1990) 171 C.L.R. 1, 17-18
(Mason, C.J., Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, and McHugh, JJ.); Wentworth v. NewS. Wales
Bar Ass'n (Austl. 1992) 176 C.L.R. 239, 250-54 (Deane, Dawson, Toohey, and Gaudron, JJ.).
72. Davis v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1988) 166 C.L.R. 79, 100 (Mason, C.J., Deane, and
Gaudron, JJ.); Australian Communist Party v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1951) 83 C.L.R. l, 192-95
(Dixon, J.); see also George Williams, Reading the Judicial Mind· Appellate Argument in the
Communist Party Case, 15 SYDNEY L. REv. 3, 23-25 (1993). Where a statute can be justified only
as a means to accomplish an end in power, an unnecessary impact on fundamental values may
suggest the law was not designed to accomplish that end.
In Nationwide News, Chief Justice Mason observed:
Davis establishes two propositions. First, that, even if the purpose of a
law is to achieve an end within power, it will not fall within the scope of what
is incidental to the substantive power unless it is reasonably and appropriately
adapted to the pursuit of an end within power, i.e., unless it is capable of being
considered to be reasonably proportionate to the pursuit of that end. Secondly,
in determining whether that requirement of reasonable proportionality is satisfied, it is material to ascertain whether, and to what extent, the law goes beyond
what is reasonably necessary or conceivably desirable for the achievement of
the legitimate object sought to be attained and, in so doing, causes adverse consequences unrelated to the achievement of that object. In particular, it is
material to ascertain whether those adverse consequences result in any
infringement of fundamental values traditionally protected by the common law,
such as freedom of expression.
Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v. Wills, 177 C.L.R. at 30-31 (Mason, C.J.) (footnotes omitted).
73. Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v. Wills (Austl. 1992) 177 C.L.R. l.
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of the Industrial Relations Commission. 74 Four Justices did so on the grounds of
an implied freedom of speech.75 The other three Justices said that the statute was
not reasonably appropriate as a means of exercising any specific power, and did
not reach the issue of implied freedom.76
On the same day, in Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth (A CTV),71 the High Court struck down a commonwealth ban on
broadcasting political advertising during election periods in commonwealth,
state, and territorial elections.78 The statute had prohibited the broadcast of any
matter on behalf of the government or political advertisements by anyone during
the election period, with exemptions for news programs and the like.79 It also
required the allocation of free broadcast time to candidates during this period.IO
Because the Constitution granted Parliament power to regulate broadcasting, 81
the High Court had to decide whether the power was specifically limited.82 The
Justices ruled that an implied freedom limited the granted power. 83
Then Chief Justice Anthony Mason observed that "[f]reedom of communication [in relation to public affairs and political discussion] is so indispensable to
the efficacy of the system of representative government for which the
Constitution makes provision that it is necessarily implied in the making of that
provision."84 He stated that the implied freedom extends to all matters of public
affairs because there is no limit on matters that may be relevant to debate in the
Commonwealth Parliament and because the fiscal relationship between
Commonwealth and state governments creates the potential for matters of local

74. /d. at 2. The High Court found that the statute which proscribed ''Words calculated to
bring a member of the Commission or the Commission into disrepute" was not subject to the
defenses normally available for persons charged with contempt of court. /d. at 26 (Mason, C.J.).
But it is very unlikely that the legislators who adopted the statute and the commission that reviewed
it recognized that this law would be interpreted to muzzle truthful criticism that demonstrated
commission improprieties.
75. /d. at 48-49 (Brennan, J.), 72-77 (Deane and Toohey, JJ.), and 94-95 (Gaudron, J.).
76. /d. at 23 (Mason, C.J.), 84 (Danson, J.), 95 (McHugh, J.).
77. Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1992) 177 C.L.R.
106.
78. /d. at 147 (Mason, C.J.).
79. /d. at 124.
80. /d.
81. Section 51(v) of the Australian Constitution grants power with respect to "postal, telt}graphic, telephonic, and other like services." AUSTL. CoNST. ch. V, § 5l(v). Radio and television
broadcasting are "like services" under this section. See Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1966) 115 C.L.R. 418,432 (Kitto, J.); Jones v. Commonwealth (No.2) (Austl. 1965)
112 C.L.R. 206, 226 (Kitto, J.).
82. Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth, 177 C.L.R. at 142-43
(Mason, C.J.).
83. /d. at 147.
84. /d. at 140.
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concern to become national.ss Therefore, the implied freedom applied to the
entire statute, including the regulations dealing with state and territorial elections.
Justices Deane, Toohey, and Gaudron agreed that the implied freedom applied to
candidate discussion in all elections and that it was violated by the prohibition on
political advertising combined with a system of free time that favored established
political parties and discriminated against new ones. 86
Two years after ACTV, the High Court applied the new implied freedom in
three cases, two of which involved state laws. By a four to three margin, the
High Court stated that the implied freedom of political discussion in the
Australian Constitution restricted common-law libel and state libel statutes as
applied to criticism of federal legislators in Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly
Times Ltd. fr1 and that a similar implication in a state constitution restricted their
application to criticism of state legislators in Stephens v. West Australian
Newspapers Ltd.88 In Cunliffe v. Commonwealth,'i1J the same four judges ruled
that the implied freedom in the Australian Constitution applied to advising and
representing aliens on immigration matters, although the High Court upheld the
statute with the vote of one of the four who had declared the implied freedom
applicable. ro
Chief Justice Mason, joined by Justices Gaudron and Toohey in both
Theophanous and Stephens, interpreted the implied freedom of political discussion broadly, quoting Eric Barendt's definition of "political speech" to describe

85. /d. at 142.
86. Id. at 174 (Deane and Toohey, JJ.), 212 (Gaudron, J.). Justice McHugh agreed that the
Act unconstitutionally interfered with freedom of choice in federal elections. /d. at 227 (McHugh,
J.). He found that the Act's application to state elections was unconstitutional because it interfered
with the functioning of the states. /d. at 244-45. Justice Brennan agreed that there was a
constitutional implication of freedom of communication in federal elections, but he did not believe
that the statute violated it. /d. at 149-62 (Brennan, J.). On the other hand, he agreed with Justice
McHugh that a portion of the law impermissibly impaired the states. /d. at 162-64. Justice Dawson
dissented since he thought the law was valid entirely. /d. at 189 (Dawson, J.).
'ir1. Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. (Austl. 1994) 182 C.L.R. 104. The joint
opinion of Chief Justice Mason, Justi~e Toohey, and Justice Gaudron controlled.
88. Stephens v. West Australian Newspapers Ltd. (Austl. 1994) 182 C.L.R. 211. Again
the joint opinion of Chief Justice Mason and Justices Toohey and Gaudron controlled on the issue
of the existence of the implied freedom and the standard to be applied because of the supporting
vote of Justice Deane who would have given even greater protection to the speech. The three
justices found, however, that the defense pleaded in one count was bad because the defendant failed
to allege that publication was neither knowingly false nor reckless and was reasonable in the
circumstances. /d. at 231-34 (Mason, C.J., Toohey, and Gaudron, JJ.).
89. Cunliffe v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1994) 182 C.L.R. 272.
90. /d.
Although a majority-Chief Justice Mason, Justices Deane, Toohey, and
Gaudron-found the implied freedom applicable, Justice Toohey found no violation. /d. at 378-85
(Toohey, J.). Toohey's vote, together with the three justices-Brennan, Dawson, and McHughwho found the implied freedom of political discussion inapplicable, resulted in upholding the law.
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what is protected: '"all speech relevant to the development of public opinion on
the whole range of issues which an intelligent citizen should think about.'"91
The plurality applied a balancing test which weighed the need to protect
the efficacious working of representative democracy against protection of individual reputation. 92 They observed that the common law of libel tilted too far
against freedom of communication, 93 but the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan94
standard used in the United States, which placed the burden on the plaintiff to
prove knowing falsity or reckless disregard, tilted too far against reputational
interests.95 Justice Deane voted with the plurality, although he would have
completely abrogated state defamation laws with respect to publication of statements about the official conduct or suitability of a member of the Parliament or
other holder of high Commonwealth office. 96
While the majority's views on implied freedom were broad, the orders
tended to be narrow. The question presented in Stephens was whether a defense
to a defamation suit brought by a state legislator that was pleaded in terms of an
implied freedom of communication was bad in law.97 The defendant failed to
anticipate the Theophanous standard; the pleading assumed that plaintiff would
have to demonstrate a violation of the New York Times standard. 98 The High

91. Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd., 182 C.L.R. at 124 (quoting ERIC
BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 152 (1985)). In separate opinions in Cunliffe, each of the members
of the Theophanous majority found migration agents within this concept. Chief Justice Mason
stated that freedom "necessarily extends to the workings of the courts and tribunals which
administer and enforce the laws of this country." Cunliffe v. Commonwealth, 182 C.L.R. at 298
(Mason, C.J.). Justice Deane explained that immigration assistance and immigration
representations "constitute communication and discussion about matters relating to the government
of the Commonwealth, that is to say, political communication and discussion." /d. at 340-41
(Deane, J.). Justice Gaudron concurred with Justice Deane on this point. /d. at 387 (Gaudron, J.).
Justice Toohey held that freedom "must include the communication of information and the
expression of opinions regarding matters that involve a minister of the Government." /d. at 380
(Toohey, J.).
92. Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd., 182 C.L.R. at 131-33 (Mason, C.J.,
Toohey, and Gaudron, JJ.).
93. /d. at 131.
94. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
95. The plurality would permit an affirmative defense in defamation actions brought by
public officials if it is established that (1) the defendant was unaware of the falsity, (2) the defendant did not publish recklessly-not caring if the statement was true or false, and (3) the
publication was reasonable in the circumstances-steps were taken to determine the truth or there
were sufficient reasons for failing to take such steps. Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times
Ltd., 182 C.L.R. at 140-41 (Mason, C.J., Toohey, and Gaudron, JJ.).
96. /d. at 188 (Deane, J.).
.
97. Stephens v. West Australian Newspapers Ltd. (Austl. 1994) 182 C.L.R. 211, 229-31
(Mason, C.J., Toohey, and Gaudron, JJ.).
98. See id. at 234.
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Court ruled that the pleading based on an implied freedom was erroneous.99 In
Cunliffe, the High Court upheld a migration agent registration law against an
implied freedom challenge. 100 Only in Theophanous did the High Court hold
proper a pleading based on an implied freedom.IOI
In two 1996 decisions, the High Court indicated that it would give significant deference to the legislature in applying the implied freedom. In Langer v.
Commonwealth, 102 the High Court upheld a Commonwealth law that prohibited
persons from encouraging voters to mark their ballots in a manner not in accord
with the ballot directions. 103 The High Court reaffirmed the existence of some
implied freedom, but ruled that it had not been violated. 104 The Justices concluded that the law was "reasonably capable of being viewed as appropriate and
adapted" to implement a proper policy relating to voting procedures. 105 Only
Justice Dawson dissented, arguing that it violated the Constitutional provisions
for elections by the people for government to punish people for telling electors
the truth about a lawful means of voting. 105
A similar state statute regulating elections for state legislators was unanimously upheld in Muldowney v. South Australia. 107 Not only did the Court hold
that the law was appropriate and adapted, but members pointed out that the
implication from the Commonwealth Constitution was to maintain the processes
of the Commonwealth and not those of the states. l!ll
99. /d.
100. Cunliffe v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1994) 182 C.L.R. 272, 333 (Brennan, J.), 367
(Dawson, J.), 385 (Toohey, J.), 397 (McHugh, J.).
101. Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd., 182 C.L.R. at 140 (Mason, C.J.,
Toohey, and Gaudron, JJ.).
102. Langer v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1996) 134 A.L.R. 400.
103. /d. at 405 (Brennan, C.J.).
104. /d. at 405-06.
105. /d. at 419 (Toohey and Gaudron, JJ.); see David S. Bogen, Telling the Truth and

Paying for It: A Comparison of Two Cases-Restrictions on Political Speech in Australia and
Commercial Speech in the United States, 7 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. Ill, 117-20 (1996)
(discussing Langer v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1996) 134 A.L.R. 400).
106. Langer v. Commonwealth, 134 A.L.R. at 412 (Dawson, J., dissenting).
107. Muldowney v. South Australia (Austl. 1996) 136 A.L.R. 18.
108. Chief Justice Brennan said that the implied freedom of political discussion in the
Commonwealth Constitution did not apply to state regulations of state elections. /d at 22-23
(Brennan, C.J.). Justice Toohey stressed his view that the Commonwealth Constitution did not crt>
ate any implication of representative government at the state level. /d. at 29 (Toohey, J.). Justice
Gummow found the law would be constitutional even if the implied freedom were applicable, so he
did not find it necessary to rule on whether the Commonwealth implied freedom applies to state
regulations of state electoral processes. /d. at 40 (Gummow, J.). Justice McHugh agreed with
Gummow's opinion, but he had previously stated that the implication from the federal constitution
did not apply to state elections. /d. at 35 (McHugh, J.). Justice Gaudron's concurring opinion
maintained the applicability of the implied freedom of political discussion in state elections. /d. at
30 (Gaudron, J.). She acknowledged that '1t]he purpose of the freedom to discuss political matters
identified in Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills and in Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v
Commonwealth is to maintain the democratic processes of the Commonwealth of Australia, not
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1997: Lange, Kruger, and Levy

Although the first decisions on the implied freedom of political communication seemed to suggest a general principle of representative democracy was
implicit in the Constitution, the High Court has now rejected the implication of
any principle that is not tied to the specific provisions of the Constitution.H~
Three decisions in 1997 examined the implied freedom, taking up a challenge to
reexamine the concept that Justice Gummow had issued the previous year in a
reapportionment case, McGinty v. State of Western Australia.l 10
The reconsideration took place primarily in Lange v. Australian Broadcasting Corp.l1 1 David Russell Lange, the former premier of New Zealand, sued
the Australian Broadcasting Corporation for defamation.112 The defendant
pleaded both the constitutioml implied freedom and a common-law qualified
those of its States." /d. Thus, her opinion was consistent with that of Justice Toohey.
Nevertheless, she contended that the interrelationship of commonwealth and state governments
made the implied freedom applicable to state as well as federal legislatures. /d. at 31-32.
109. See Lange v. Australian Broad. Corp. (Austl. 1997) 145 A.L.R. 96, 112.
llO. McGinty v. Western Australia (Austl. 1996) 134 A.L.R. 289. Justice Gummow
followed Justice McHugh in raising serious questions over whether any implication could be drawn
from a principle of representative democracy apart from the specific provisions of the Constitution.
/d. at 290-91 (McHugh, J.). In McGinty, the plaintiffs claimed that electoral districts must be equal
in population because the Constitution required members of the House of Representatives of the
Commonwealth Parliament to be "chosen by the people"-"one man, one vote" in United States
terms. /d. at 293-94 (Brennan, C.J .); see also AUSTL. CONST. ch. I, § 24. The plaintiffs argued that
ACTV supported their theory becllUSe it relied on a principle of representative democracy implicit in
the electoral provisions. McGinty v. Western Australia, 134 A.L.R. at 364 (Gummow, J.). Justice
Gummow, who replaced retired Chief Justice Mason, joined the Theophanous dissenters to uphold
the existing electoral system. /d. at 390. They said that "chosen by the people" meant elections
must be direct rather than indirect. /d. at 378. Although individual voters in a direct election must
have an opportunity to discuss political issues in order to satisfy the constitutional requirement of
choice, that does not control the size of the district in which they vote. /d.
Justice Gummow accepted the implied freedom precedent of ACTV, but he suggested the
need to reexamine the 1994 cases. /d. at 364. He saw them as suggesting a principle of
representation beyond the specific provisions of the Constitution:
[T]he process of constitutional interpretation by which this principle was
derived (being an implication at a secondary level), and the nature of the implication (which restrains not only the exercise of legislative, executive or judicial
power but also what otherwise would be the operation of the general law upon.
private rights and obligations) departed from previously accepted methods of
constitutional interpretation. If it now were sought to apply the princi pie then
the need for further examination of it would arise.
/d. at 391.
Ill. Lange v. Australian Broad. Corp. (Austl. 1997) 145 A.L.R. 96.
ll2 /d. at 99.
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privilege, and the High Court took the occasion to reexamine its rulings in
Theophanous and Stephens. 113 With Justice Michael Kirby replacing the retired
Justice Deane, the High Court mustered a unanimous opinion. 114
The opinion struck a compromise, rejecting several statements in Stephens
and Theophanous, while reaffirming the basic implication of a constitutional
freedom. 115 Although the High Court disavowed any principle of representative
democracy apart from the Constitutional provisions, it left open how far the
implications from those provisions might extend and it gave an even greater
reach to the common-law privilege.116 The High Court struck down the constitutional defense and concluded that the common-law qualified privilege was not
supported by the particulars of the case.tt7
The High Court stated that the implied constitutional freedom precluded
the operation of English common-law defamation:
Theophanous and Stephens should be accepted as deciding that in Australia
the common law rules of defamation must conform to the requirements of
the Constitution. Those cases should also be accepted as deciding that, at
113. /d. at 96.
114. /d.
115. The High Court drew the support of the majority from the earlier cases by reaffirming
the existence of an implied freedom incompatible with the common law as it previously existed.
The Justices stated that the implied freedom extended beyond the election period, contrary to suggestions in Justice McHugh's dissent in Theophanous, and that it applied to reports of the conduct
of the executive branch, and could, in particular cases, reach discussion of matters at the state and
local levels. /d. at 107.
McHugh and Dawson had been particularly critical of extensions beyond specific constitutional provisions. SeeTheophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. (Austl. 1994) 182 C.L.R. 104,
198-205 (McHugh, J.); Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1992) 177
C.L.R. 106, 184 (Dawson, J.). They were reassured that the freedom of communication was tied to
Constitutional provisions and not a principle that might extend beyond the areas dealt with by those
provisions. Lange v. Australian Broad. Corp., 145 A.L.R. at Ill. Chief Justice Brennan argued
that the Constitution was 'not incompatible with the common law. Theophanous v. Herald &
Weekly Times Ltd., 182 C.L.R. at 153 (Brennan, J.). An expansion of the common law qualified
privilege, citing language from Justice McHugh in Stephens v. West Australian Newspapers Ltd.
resulted in finding that the common law was compatible. Lange v. Australian Broad. Corp., 145
A.L.R. at 115-16 (citing Stephens v. West Australian Newspapers Ltd. (Austl. 1994) 182 C.L.R.
211, 264). The opinion in Lange reinstated protection for plaintiffs where the statement was
actuated by malice. See id. at 118. Even if the defendant met its burden of showing that its
conduct was otherwise reasonable, plaintiff could defeat the qualified privilege by demonstrating
that the speech was "actuated" by malice. /d. The High Court agreed with Chief Justice Brennan's
insistence that the implied freedom was not an individual right but a limitation on the granted
power. /d. at 119. Finally, it required plaintiff to allege sufficient particulars to show the
relationship to the specific Constitutional provision and did not permit any inference to be made
that discussion of politics of another country would necessarily be within the freedom of
communication. /d.
116. Lange v. Australian Broad. Corp., 145 A.L.R. at 104-06.
117. /d. at 119.
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least by 1992, the constitutional implication precluded an unqualified application in Australia of the English common law of defamation in so far as it
continued to provide no defense for the mistaken publication of defamatory
matter concerning government and political matters to a wide audience. 118

In so doing, rather than supplanting the common law with the Constitution,
the High Court changed the common law. Unlike in the United States where the
"common law" is decided for each state by its own courts, the common law in
Australia is determined by the High Court for all jurisdictions and thus is truly
"common" throughout the land.l 19 Still, in developing the common law, the High
Court noted that courts must act consistently with the Constitution.•~ "The common law of libel and slander could not be developed inconsistently with the
Constitution, for the common law's protection of personal reputation must admit
as an exception that qualified freedom to discuss government and politics which
is required by the Constitution."l21
In expanding the common-law qualified privilege in Lange, the Court
could and did go beyond the requirements of the Constitution. It extended the
privilege to protect communications made to the public on a government or
political matter.l 22 The High Court concluded that political and governmental
matters should be considered of interest to everyone:
With the increasing integration of the social, economic and political
life of Australia, it is difficult to contend that the exercise or failure to exercise public functions or powers at any particular level of government or
administration, or in any part of the country, is not of relevant interest to the
public of Australia generally .•n

By reaching the discussion of government and political matters that affect
the people of Australia, the privilege could apply to speech not within the freedom of communication implied from the specific constitutional provisions on
federal elections, responsible government, and constitutional amendment:

118.
119.
120.
121.
122

/d. at 103.

at 108-09.
/d. at 111.

/d.

/d.
/d. at 115. The High Court held that the qualified privilege includes as a criterion
"reasonableness of conduct" when the privilege is applied to publications that would not have been
considered subject to the qualified privilege at English common law. /d. at 117. Further, the
defense will be defeated if the plaintiff proves that the publication was "actuated" by ill will or
other improper motive. /d. at 117-18. In this respect, the High Court reversed Theophanous. /d. at

118.
123. /d. at 115 (quoting Stephens v. West Australian Newspapers Ltd. (Austl. 1994) 182
C.L.R. 211, 264 (McHugh, J.)).
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For example, discussion of matters concerning the United Nations or
other countries may be protected by the extended defense of qualified
privilege, even if those discussions cannot illuminate the choice for electors
at federal elections or in amending the Constitution or cannot throw light on
the administration of federal government.
Similarly, discussion of government or poiitics at State or Territory
level and even at local government level is amenable to protection by the
extended category of qualified privilege, whether or not it bears on matters
at the federallevel.J24

In Lange, the defendant pleaded that the publication concerned the plaintiff
as a member of the New Zealand Parliament and as Prime Minister of New Zealand.125 Because the pleadings revealed no connection with Australia, the High
Court held that they did not bring the publication within the extended defense,
leaving open the possibility that further particulars could bring the publication
within the defense. 126 "By reason of matters of geography, history, and constitutional and trading arrangements, however, the discussion of matters concerning
New Zealand may often affect or throw light on government or political matters
in Australia."IZ7
The High Court emphasized that its interpretation of an implied freedom of
communication served to preserve the operation of the system of government,
rather than to protect the individual:
Unlike the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which
has been interpreted to confer private rights, our Constitution contains no
express right of freedom of communication or expression. Within our legal
system, communications are free only to the extent that they are left
unburdened by laws that comply with the Constitution. 128

Thus, the High Court concluded that the defendants' claim that the matter was
"published pursuant to a freedom guaranteed by the Commonwealth Constitution
was bad in law." 129 The proper defense should be framed as a common-law or
statutory privilege. Any claim that a statute improperly diminished that privilege
in violation of the Constitution would not be stated as a defense to the defamation
complaint, but as a response to specific assertion of that statute. 130 In other

124. /d. at 115-16.
125. /d. at 99.
126. /d. at 96.
127. /d. at 119.
128. /d. at 112.
129. /d. at 96.
130. The High Court also held that the New South Wales defamation statute did not place
an undue burden on protected communications, because section 22 protected matter published to
HeinOnline -- 46 Drake L. Rev. 72 1997-1998

1997]

Religion Clauses and Freedom of Speech

73

words, rather than claiming a right to speak, the defendant must claim that the
legislature or the executive acted beyond its power. The focus should be on the
extent of the powers of government rather than on individual rights.
In construing the freedom of communication, the High Court left open a
broad area for application. Freedom of communication protects not only free
choice in federal elections, but also free choice in constitutional referenda. Furthermore, because the executive branch is responsible to the legislature, the
implied freedom extends to communication concerning the behavior of the
executive and how the legislators react to it. "[T]he Constitution requires "the
people" to be able to communicate with each other with respect to matters that
could affect their choice in federal elections or constitutional referenda or that
could throw light on the performance of ministers of State and the conduct of the
executive branch of government." 131 Although the implied freedom arises from
provisions on commonwealth government and referenda to amend the Constitution, it could extend as well to discussions of state policy when they impact
electors' choices at the federal level:
Of course, the discussion of matters at State, Territory or local level
might bear on the choice that the people have to make in federal elections or
in voting to amend the Constitution, and on their evaluation of the performance of federal ministers and their departments. The existence of national
political parties operating at federal, State, Territory and local government
levels, the financial dependence of State, Territory and local governments
on federal funding and policies, and the increasing integration of social,
economic and political matters in Australia make this conclusion
inevitable. 132

The other two cases from 1997, Kruger v. Commonwealth 133 and Levy v.
Victoria, 134 suggested further limits on the extent to which the implied freedom
could be expanded. Kruger raised the !ection 116 free exercise clause claim and
dealt with implied freedoms. 135 The plaintiffs claimed that laws in the territory
restraining the movement of aborigines and removing them from their homes
were an impingement on the freedom of movement and of association necessary
to have political communication. 136 But the Australian Constitution does not
mandate elections in territories, and several justices indicated that the implied

any person where the recipient had an interest or apparent interest in having information on a
subject and the conduct of the publisher was reasonable in the circumstances. /d. at 114.
131. /d. at 115.
132. /d. at 116.
133. Kruger v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1997) 146 A.L.R. 126.
134. Levy v. Victoria (Austl. 1997) 146 A.L.R. 248.
135. Kruger v. Commonwealth, 146 A.L.R. at 128-29.
136. /d. at 126.

HeinOnline -- 46 Drake L. Rev. 73 1997-1998

74

Drake Law Review

[Vol. 46

freedom of political discussion did not apply in this case. 137 Justice Gummow
argued that even if some freedom and movement and association is necessary to
make political communication effective, it did not stretch to the familial association at issue in the case.' 38 Justice Toohey acknowledged that the implied
freedom included movement and association, but found no invalidity in these
laws. 139 Justice Gaudron, however, contended that the discussion of Commonwealth territorial policy was basic to representative and responsible government
of the Commonwealth, and that excluding anyone from that discussion impairs
it.l40
In Levy, although the High Court made it clear that the implied freedom
applied to expressive conduct as well as to verbal statements, the justices focused
on the legitimacy of the law in question rather than on whether the implied freedom extended to the behavior regulated. 141 In that case, animal rights protesters
challenged regulations that forbade persons without a license from entering
hunting areas during the first two days of hunting season. 142 The High Court
assumed for the purposes of its decision that the implied freedom applied to these
regulations, but ruled that they were valid laws in pursuit of safety .143 Even Justice Michael McHugh,. while suggesting the connection between the anti-hunting
message and the constitutionally-protected freedom was not clear, rooted the
decision on the conclusion that the law was reasonably appropriate and adapted
to serving an end compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally
prescribed government. 144
Lange, Kruger, and Levy were particularly important in settling the contours of the implied freedom because the court personnel is rapidly changing.
Justice Dawson retired in August of 1997. Justice Toohey has announced his
plans to retire in February of 1998. Chief Justice Brennan will also retire in
1998. Of the seven Justices who decided ACTV, only Justices Gaudron and
McHugh will remain. Nevertheless, the Court's unanimity in Lange
demonstrates that the implied freedom has become an accepted tenet of
Australian constitutional law.
The scope of the implied freedom will probably vary with the composition
of the court. For instance, some communications that Justice Gaudron would
find necessary for free choice in elections would be beyond the reach that Justice
McHugh would give the constitutionally implied freedom. Fortunately, there is a
core of speech by and about candidates for office and the behavior of officials
over which they have control that the entire High Court will find constitutionally
protected.

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142
143.
144.

/d. at 163 (Dawson, J.), 219 (McHugh, J.).
/d. at 229 (Gummow, J.).
!d. at 178-79 (Toohey, J.).
!d. at 195-200 (Gaudron, J.).
Levy v. Victoria (Austl. 1997) 146 A.L.R. 248, 252 (Brennan, C.J.).
/d. at 250.
/d. at 251-52.
!d. at 277 (McHugh, J.).
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The Standards for Determining a Violation

In Theophanous, the plurality explored the tension existing between common-law defamation and the requirements for a representative government and
balanced the interests of individual reputation against those needs.t45 Both a balancing test and a concern for systemic needs appear to focus on the effect rather
than the purpose of the challenged law. Nevertheless, the underlying concern of
the High Court is with the purpose of the law. That is evident in the criteria for
constitutionality unanimously articulated in lAnge:
[T]he freedom will not invalidate a law enacted to satisfy some other
legitimate end if the law satisfies two conditions. The first condition is that
the object of the law is compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of representative and responsible government or the
procedure for submitting a proposed amendment to the Constitution to the
informed decision of the people which the Constitution prescribes. The
second is that the law is reasonably appropriate and adapted to achieving
that legitimate object or end. t46

If a law must be "enacted to satisfy some other legitimate end" to be valid, the
High Court must determine whether the purpose of the law was legitimate. The
conditions for upholding such a law are mechanisms for assuring the legitimacy
of the purpose. The first condition demands that a legitimate purpose exists, and
the second requires a relationship demonstrating that purpose is in fact the law's
objective.
a. The Legitimate Objective Test. The Lange court's first condition
requires a law burdening the implied freedom to have a valid objective, one
which is "compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed
system." 147 It is the law's objective, not its effect, that this condition addresses.
Some objectives are plainly incompatible. Restrictions on speech enacted to perpetuate the government or its policies by preventing electors from hearing
negative viewpoints are inconsistent with the freedom of political discussion
derived from the constitutional provisions for representative and responsible
government.
Prior decisions applying the Implied freedom have distinguished, in some
way, between direct and incidental impairments.148 Such distinctions are based
145. Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. (Austl. 1994) 182 C.L.R. 104, 125-33.
146. Lange v. Australian Broad. Corp. (Austl. 1997) 145 A.L.R. 96, 108.
147. !d. at 96-97.
148. Former Chief Justice Mason distinguished between restrictions ''which target ideas or
information [direct impairments within the meaning of this paper] and those which restrict an
activity or mode of communication by which ideas or information are transmitted [which may be
incidental impairments]." Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1992)
177 C.L.R. 106, 143 (Mason, C.J.). Justice McHugh distinguished between "Jaws which restrict
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upon concern with the purpose of the law. A direct impairment indicates that
suppression of political discussion was the law's objective while the incidental
nature of an impairment indicates an objective unrelated to such suppression.
Although the directness of the regulation of the content of political discussion
suggests the purpose was the illegitimate one of suppressing political speech, the
government may show that the law in fact had a proper objective.
The purposes which a direct regulation of political discussion may validly
serve have been variously described. Justices Toohey and Deane have stated that
a law restricting political communications would be valid where
the prohibitions and restrictions on political communications which it
imposes are either conducive to the overall availability of the effective
means of such communications or do not go beyond what is reasonably
necessary for the preservation of an ordered and democratic society or for
the protection or vindication of the legitimate claims of indiviquals to live
peacefully and with dignity within such a society. 149

the freedom of electoral communications by prohibiting or regulating their contents and laws which
incidentally limit that freedom by regulating the time, place or manner of communication." !d. at
234-35 (McHugh, J.).
Justices Deane and Toohey used characterization to distinguish between laws that
affect political communications for reasons related to their nature as political communications
(direct) and those whose effect is unrelated (incidental):
[A) law whose character is that of a law with respect to the prohibition or
control of some or all communications relating to government or governmental
instrumentalities will be much more difficult to justify as consistent with the
implication than will a law whose character is that of a law with respect to some
other subject and whose effect on such communications is unrelated to their
nature as communications of the relevant kind.
Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v. Wills (Austl. 1992) 177 C.L.R. I, 76-77 (Deane and Toohey, JJ.).
Chief Justice Brennan insisted that a law that infringes the limitation on power will not be supported by the "power unless the infringement is merely incidental to the achievement of a
legitimate (that is, non-infringing) purpose or object." Cunliffe v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1994)
182 C.L.R. 272, 324 (Brennan, J.). Justice Gaudron insisted that curtailing political discussion was
an impermissible purpose for a law, but said that a law enacted to secure an end within power may
be permissible despite its "incidental" impact on the protected freedom. Nationwide News Pty.
Ltd. v. Wills, 177 C.L.R. at 95 (Gaudron, J.). Finally, Justice Gummow stressed the legitimacy of
the statute's primary objective in upholding a statute challenged as a violation of the implied freedom. Langer v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1996) 134 A.L.R. 400,432 (Gummow, J.) ('The primary
objective of the system established by the legislation involves observance by electors of [section]
240.").
149. Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth, 177 C.L.R. at 169 (Deane
and Toohey, JJ.) (footnote omitted).
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Justice Deane later wrote that '"necessary' in this context implies the existence of
a pressing social need, and that interference with freedom of expression should
be no more than is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued." 1SO
In general, the likelihood that a direct regulation of speech has an objective
that is incompatible with the maintenance of the system has led justices to
demand strong justifications for such laws. Chief Justice Mason and Justice
McHugh would require a "compelling justification" to uphold direct regulations.151 Justice Gaudron referred to "an overriding and important public
interest" as necessary to show that a law imposing a direct prohibition on political discussion had a valid purpose. 152 Where only a minor public interest is
offered for a direct prohibition on political discussion, the asserted justification is
likely to be a pretext for an impermissible objective. 153
In Kruger, Justice Gaudron stated that the only test for a law is whether the
purpose of the law is to prohibit or restrict political communication. 154
"Questions directed to compelling justification, necessity and proportionality are,
at base, questions directed to ascertaining the purpose of the law in question." 155
She then set out the relationship between the search for purpose and the
distinction between direct and indirect burdens on political communication:
[T]he purpose of a law is to be ascertained by its nature, its operation and
the facts with which it deals. In ascertaining that purpose, a law which is, in
terms, a prohibition or restriction on political communication or which
operates directly to prevent or curtail discussion of political matters is, in
my view, to be taken to have that purpose unless the prohibition or restriction is necessary for the attainment of some overriding public purpose (for
example, to prevent criminal conspiracies) or, in the terms used by Deane J
in Cunliffe v The Commonwealth, to satisfy some "pressing social need"
(for example, to prevent sedition). 156

b. Proportionality and the "Appropriate and Adapted" Test. Even if the
government identifies a legitimate objective furthered by the challenged law, the
High Court will examine the relationship between the means and the purported
legitimate end of the law. The High Court in Lange referred to the problem of
describing how that examination should take place:

150. Cunliffe v. Commonwealth, 182 C.L.R. at 340 (Deane, J.) (quoting Attorney General
v. Guardian Newspapers (No.2) (Austl. 1990) 1 A. C. 109, 283-84) (internal quotes omitted).
151. Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth, 177 C.L.R. at 143 (Mason,
C.J.), 235 (McHugh, J.).
152 Cunliffe v. Commonwealth, 182 C.L.R. at 388 (Gaudron, J.).
153. /d.
154. Kruger v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1997) 146 A.L.R. 126, 206 (Gaudron, J.).
155. /d.
156. /d.
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Different formulae have been used by members of this court in other cases
to express the test whether the freedom provided by the Constitution has
been infringed. Some judges have expressed the test as whether the law is
reasonably appropriate and adapted to the fulfillment of a legitimate
purpose. Others have favoured different expressions, including
proportionality. 157

Most Justices have insisted that the means be proportionate to the end of
furthering a competing public interest, even if the law does not discriminate
among speakers or ideas. 158 Proportionality is relevant to determining the true
purpose of the statute. 1S9
Chief Justice Brennan would use proportionality to test the validity of a
law that restricts communication while serving a legitimate interest.160 "[T]he
restriction must serve some other legitimate interest and it must be proportionate
to the interest to be served." 161 Brennan subsequently explained that proportionality "is intended to embrace both the law's achieving of a legitimate purpose and
the incidental character of its restriction on an absolute freedom to discuss government, governmental institutions and political matters." 162 In Cunliffe, Justice
Brennan equated "proportionate" with "reasonably appropriate and adapted" to a
legitimate end. 163

157. Lange v. Australian Broad. Corp. (Austl. 1997) 145 A.L.R. 96, 108.
158. Justice McHugh would examine content neutral laws affecting the implied freedom to
determine whether the restraint "is not disproportionate to the end sought to be achieved:' Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1992) 177 C.L.R. 106, 235 (McHugh,
J.). Justice Toohey said, "the requirement of reasonable proportionality assists in the reconciliation
of what may be proffered as irreconcilable principles. The implied freedom does not override the
express grant of power. Rather, it points to the likely limits of the express grant." Cunliffe v.
Commonwealth, 182 C.L.R. at 376 (Toohey, J .). Justice Kirby would also use proportionality to
test laws challenged as impairing the freedom of political communication. Levy v. Victoria (Austl.
1997) 146 A.L.R. 248, 292 ("It is a useful concept, including in the context of burdens upon constitutional freedoms, so long as it is realized that it describes a process of reasoning and does not
provide a sure answer to its outcome.").
159. Former Chief Justice Mason wrote that the public interest in free communication must
be balanced against the competing public interest and that the restriction must be reasonably necessary to achieve the competing public interest. Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v.
Commonwealth, 177 C.L.R. at 143-44 (Mason, C.J.) ("If the restriction imposes a burden on free
communication that is disproportionate to the attainment of the competing public interest, then the
existence of the disproportionate burden indicates that the purpose and effect of the restriction is in
fact to impair freedom of communication.").
160. Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth, 177 C.L.R. at 150
(Brennan, J.).
161. /d.
162 Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. (Austl. 1994) 182 C.L.R. 104, 152
(Brennan, J.).
163. Cunliffe v. Commonwealth, 182 C.L.R. at 324 (Brennan, J.). Reiterating his views in
Langer, Chief Justice Brennan stated, "In my view, if the impairment of the freedom is reasonably
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Justice Gaudron used proportionality to determine purpose in two different
ways. Where the law directly interferes with political communications, the interference requires a compelling justification and the law must be necessary to
achieve that end. 164 ''Whether a law is necessary for some such purpose depends
on whether it is 'no more than is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.'
That in tum depends on whether less drastic measures are available.'' 165 The less
drastic alternative comparison is not necessary to determine the proportionality of
a measure when the impact on speech is clearly incidental. 166 In that context,
Justice Gaudron simply equated proportionality with "appropriate and
adapted." 167
There are few Australian cases concerning proportionality as an element of
limitations on power. 168 The initial implied freedom cases examined laws that
applied only to expressive activities such as criticism of government officials,
political advertising, defamation of federal or state officials, advice to or representation of immigrants, encouraging improper voting procedures in federal or
state elections, and defamation of foreign officials. Specific applications of
proportionality in those cases sparked disagreement among the Justices, sometimes because they had a different appreciation of the facts and sometimes
because they afforded the Parliament different degrees of deference. 169
capable of being regarded as appropriate and adapted to the achieving of a legitimate legislative
purpose and the impairment is merely incidental to the achievement of that purpose, the law is
within power." Langer v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1996) 134 A.L.R. 400,405-06 (Brennan, C.J.).
164. Kruger v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1997) 146 A.L.R. 126, 207 (Gaudron, J.).
165. /d. (quoting Cunliffe v. Commonwealth, 182 C.L.R. at 340 (Deane, J.)).
166. /d.
167. /d. at 207 (Gaudron, J.). Justice Gaudron stated:
[A] Jaw with respect to some subject-matter unconnected with the discussion of
political matters and which only incidentally impinges on the freedom of that
discussion, is not to be taken to be a Jaw for the purpose of restricting that
freedom if it is reasonably appropriate and a~apted or, which is the same thing,
proportionate to some legitimate purpose connected with that other subject
matter.
/d.
168. See generally Brian F. Fitzgerald, Proportionality and Australian Constitutionalism,
12 U. TASMANIA L. REV. 263 (1993); H.P. Lee, Proportionality in Australian Constitutional Adjudication, in FUTUREDIREcriONS, supra note 15, at 126-49; A.R. Blackshield, The Implied Freedom
of Communication, in FuTuRE DIRECTIONS, supra note 15, at 232-68; Brian F. Fitzgerald,
Characterization, Proportionality and Constitutional (Legislative) Validity (unpublished manuscript
on file with author).
169. For example, Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority and found portions of the
statutes at issue proportionate to the legitimate ends in ACTV. Australian Capital Television Pty.
Ltd. v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1992) 177 C.L.R. I 06, 164-67 (Brennan, J ., dissenting); see also
Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. (Austl. 1994) 182 C.L.R. 104, 154-55 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Stephens v. West Australian Newspapers Ltd. (Austl. 1994) 182 C.L.R. 211,236, 2S
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Toohey disagreed with Justices Mason, Deane, and Gaudron
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The Kruger and Levy cases involved laws of general application which the
members of the High Court found appropriate and adapted to the fulfillment of a
proper constitutional purpose, 170 but that test may apply for the constitutionality
of any law. While Justice Gaudron specifically stated that she would use proportionality to test generally applicable laws affecting the freedom of political
communication, 171 it is not clear how rigorously the Justices would scrutinize
such laws.
c. Deference. Former Chief Justice Mason insisted that the court must
determine whether the burden or restriction on political discussion is reasonably
appropriate and adapted to the relevant purpose. 172 Chief Justice Mason distinguished the High Court's role in determinations of power from its role in
assessing limitations on power like the implied freedom of political discussion. 173
In determining whether a law is within power, ''the question is whether the law is
capable of being reasonably considered to be appropriate and adapted to the end
sought to be achieved." 174 In other words, even if the High Court believes the
law is not reasonably appropriate and adapted to an end, the High Court must
uphold it if others, like the Commonwealth Parliament, could reasonably believe
the law to be appropriate and adapted to that end. When reasonable minds differ,
the law should be sustained: In contrast, where the issue is whether a limit on
power has been violated, the Court must decide for itself whether the burden is
reasonably appropriate and adapted.t75
Other justices, however, may be more deferential than former Chief Justice
Mason. Chief Justice Brennan used the same deferential standard for examining
whether a law violated a limitation on power that he used for finding a law within
power-"whether the operation of the law 'is capable of being reasonably
considered to be appropriate and adapted to achieve'" the appropriate purpose. 176
Justice Gaudron initially agreed with Justice Mason that the High Court
should decide for itself if constitutional limits had been exceeded, 177 and Justice
Toohey joined Justice Deane in saying that a law whose character is that of a law
with respect to the prohibition or control of some or all communications relating
to government demands a reasonably necessary standard. 178 These Justices did
not defer in assessing the constitutional issues in ACTV, Theophanous, and
when he found the law regulating registration of immigration agents proportionate in Cunliffe. See
Cunliffe v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1994) 182 C.L.R. 272, 380-84 (Toohey, J., dissenting).
170. See Kruger v. Commonwealth, 146 A.L.R. at 245-46; Levy v. Victoria (Austl. 1997)
146 A.L.R. 248, 252 (Brennan, C.J.).
171. Kruger v. Commonwealth, 146 A.L.R. at 207 (Gaudron, J.); Levy v. Victoria, 146
A.L.R. at 270-71 (Gaudron, J.).
172 Cunliffe v. Commonwealth, 182 C.L.R. at 300.
173. /d.
174. /d. (emphasis added).
175. /d.
176. /d. at 324 (Brennan, J.) (adopting the standard stated by Justice Deane in Richardson v.
Forestry Comm'n (Austl. 1988) 164 C.L.R. 261, 311 (Deane, J., dissenting)).
177. /d. at 387-88.
178. Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1992) 177 C.L.R.
106, 169 (Deane and Toohey, JJ.).
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Stephens. Nevertheless, Justices Toohey and Gaudron took a deferential view of
the law in Langer when the government claimed that the challenged statute actually enhanced the democratic process. Prior decisions established that deference
was appropriate for determining whether a law was within the power of Parliament to make election laws, but Justices Toohey and Gaudron gave the same
deference to Parliament when discussing whether the law violated the implied
freedom of political discussion. They supported the statute on the ground that it
was "reasonably capable of being viewed as appropriate and adapted to furthering or enhancing the democratic process." 179 Whether these Justices have
changed their position and intend to follow Chief Justice Brennan~~ in using
such a deferential standard in all cases, or whether their deference is limited to
laws purporting to enhance the political process, remains an open question. On
the one hand, Justice Gaudron indicated in Levy that the standard, "reasonably
capable of being regarded as appropriate," was a standard for determining
whether a law was an exercise of a constitutionally granted power; it was less
stringent than the one she preferred in the context of constitutional freedoms, and
she suggested that it would be inappropriate for laws directly regulating religion
or political communication. 181 In that light, her opinion in Langer was based on
the assumption that the laws promoted rather than impaired the democratic process.182 Therefore, the appropriate standard was one to determine whether it might
be said to further the democratic process, an issue of characterization, because
the implied freedom would by definition not be invoked. On the other hand, the
political advertising restrictions Justice Gaudron struck down in ACTV were
alleged to enhance the democratic process. 183

4.

Summary

In relation to the free exercise of religion, behavior dictated by religious
belief, freedom of speech, the communication of ideas, the suppression of religiously motivated behavior or of ideas is an improper ground for regulation. The
issue under the Australian Constitution's clauses on free exercise and establish-

179. Langer v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1996) 134 A.L.R. 400, 418 (Toohey and Gaudron,
JJ.). Justice Gummow did not commit himself on the standard, but he did say in upholding the
statute that the implied freedom "does not facilitate or protect that which is intended to weaken or
deplete an essential component of the system of representative government." /d. at 431 (Gummow,
J.).
180. Justice Brennan also voted in favor of the law because the impairment was "reasonably
capable of being viewed as appropriate and adapted to the achieving of a legitimate legislative purpose and the impairment is merely incidental to the achievement of that purpose." /d. at 405-06
(Brennan, C.J.).
181. Levy v. Victoria (Austl. 1997) 146 A.L.R. 248,270 (Gaudron, J.).
182. Langer v. Commonwealth, 134 A.L.R. at 418-19 (Gaudron, J.).
183. Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth, 177 C.L.R. at 118 (oral
argument of G. Griffith Q.C., Solicitor-General for the Commonwealth).

HeinOnline -- 46 Drake L. Rev. 81 1997-1998

82

Drake Law Review

[Vol. 46

ment of religion is whether a law has a forbidden objective. 184 The law's purpose
is also central to the constitutional implication of freedom of political discussion.
Speech regulation must not be based on disagreement with an idea or fear that the
idea would lead to bad results if widely accepted and democratically adopted.
But, the incidental impact on religious exercise or speech from action taken for
legitimate reasons would not abridge either the free exercise of religion or freedom of speech if those freedoms mean only that certain grounds for
governmental action are not legitimate. · The High Court examines challenged
laws to determine if the means which impact on speech are proportionate to the
legitimate end the law is supposed to serve. In the future, the High Court will
probably apply a "reasonably proportionate" test to any law of general application185 impairing the free exercise of religion as well. It is consistent with a
"purpose" analysis of the right involved, but it could be more accurate and effective in protecting that right than a direct inquiry into purpose. Indeed, the
standard of reasonable proportionality may be close to the United States test,
which requires an important or substantial interest unrelated to the suppression of
free expression and no more impairment of First Amendment freedoms than is
essential to further that interest. 186 Both standards offer an approach to a purpose-oriented analysis that gives religion and speech real protection while
allowing government to fulfill its legitimate functions. At the same time, both
raise concerns that a deferential application of the standard could allow
inappropriate laws to survive.

III.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

The United States Supreme Court is beginning to focus on the purpose of
the law in applying the First Amendment to the Constitution. This has led the
Supreme Court to exempt generally applicable laws from First Amendment scrutiny. Congress reacted to the impact of these decisions in the free exercise area
with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 187 which the Supreme Court in tum
invalidated. 188 The jurisprudence remains unsettled in establishment clause and
free speech areas.
A. Free Exercise of Religion

The word "for" in Section 116 of the Australian Constitution, which forbids the Commonwealth making any law "for establishing any religion ... or for
184. See Kruger v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1997) 146 A.L.R. 126, 138 (Brennan, C.J.).
185. A generally applicable law is a provision of law, whether statutory or common law,
regulating behavior that is usually engaged in for reasons other than the expression of ideas or the
exercise of religion. Thus, drug and alcohol restrictions, limits on polygamy, and prohibitions
against cruelty to animals are generally applicable laws. A regulation of kneeling before a railing
and consuming wine and wafers served by another would not be a generally applicable law because
that behavior is usually engaged in for religious purposes.
186. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
187. 42 u.s.c. § 2000bb (1994).
188. See City of Boerne v. Aores, 117 S. Ct. 2157,2172 (1997).
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prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, " 189 supports the High Court's focus
on whether the purpose of government action was to prohibit free exercise. The
First Amendment to the United States Constitution seems to forbid laws that have
that effect, regardless of their purpose. 1!ll Nevertheless, decisions by the United
States Supreme Court offer little more protection for religious exercise than those
of the Australian High Court.
1.

The Cases

Early United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting the free exercise
clause of the First Amendment insisted that religious belief did not excuse violations of the general criminal law .1 91 Later decisions afforded religious belief
protection from general laws. In 1963, the Supreme Court invalidated the denial
of unemployment benefits to a person who was unavailable to work on Saturday
because of her religious beliefs. In Sherbert v. Verner, 192 the Supreme Court said
that the state needed to show a "compelling interest" to justify the application of
the unemployment law to this situation. 193 The high point of the Court's solicitude for religious expression was Wisconsin v. Yoder, 194 where it held that
Wisconsin could not require Amish children to attend school beyond the eighth
grade. 195 The subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court outside the unemployment benefits context rejected free exercise claims on the grounds that the burden
on religion was insufficient to trigger the test or that the test was met. 196
Free exercise clause interpretation has now largely returned to its earliest
form as a result of the 1990 decision Employment Division v. Smith. 197 In that
case, Alfred Smith and Galen Black were fired from their jobs with a drug
rehabilitation organization in Oregon because they had consumed peyote. 198
Smith and Black sued to obtain unemployment compensation, claiming that
189. Ausn... CONST. ch. V, § 116 (emphasis added).
190. U.S. CONST. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion ... or abridging the freedom of speech ....") (emphasis added).
191. See,e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878) ("Can a man excuse
his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the
professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land ....").
192 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
193. /d. at 406.
194. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
195. /d. at 234.
196. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 458
(1988) (stating that the United States government may permit timber harvesting and road
construction through a portion of national forest traditionally used for religious purposes); Goldman
v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 506-10 (1986) (holding that uniform military law may be applied to
prohibit wearing of yarmulke in doors); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259-60 (1982) (ruling
that an Amish employer is required to participate in the social security system).
197. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
198. /d. at 874.
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denial prohibited the free exercise of their religion, because peyote use was an
essential sacrament of the Native American Church.199 Given American
concerns over drug use, it is not surprising that they lost. Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor's concurring opinion stated that the state had a sufficiently compelling
interest in drug law enforcement to prohibit drug use, even for religious
purposes.n> Justice O'Connor did not join the majority opinion, however,
because they took a much more controversial route to the same result.~1 Justice
Antonin Scalia's majority opinion suggested that neutral laws of general
applicability were immune from a First Amendment challenge.:m He compared
the drug law to a general tax and stated, "[l]f prohibiting the exercise of religion
(or burdening the activity of printing) is not the object of the tax but merely the
incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First
Amendment has not been offended. "W
Despite Justice O'Connor's belief that neutral laws of general applicability
have no "talismanic" immunity from scrutiny under the First Amendment, 204 the
Court has continued to assert that "[i]n addressing the constitutional protection
for free exercise of religion, our cases establish the general proposition that a law
that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling
governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a
particular religious practice. " 205
Thus, the United States Supreme Court, like the Australian High Court,
focuses its inquiry on the objective of a law that affects the free exercise of
religion. If the impact on free exercise is only incidental, the law will be upheld.
But generally applicable drug laws may bar sacramental peyote use as effectively
as a law that forbids only the religious use. The failure to consider the impact of
the law, the importance of the government's interest and whether the law needs
to apply to religious conduct to secure that interest, threatens to allow harm to
religious expression without furthering the legitimate interests of the government.

199. /d.
200. /d. at 906.
201. !d. at 891.
202. /d. at 879. The content neutral law is, for these purposes, a law whose application does
not tum on the religious or communicative aspect of the behavior. A law that forbids interference
with the military may be of general application because most interference will result from actions
that are not primarily the expression of the ideas such as destruction of an ammunition dump or of
files and records. But, if the determination of the existence of a law violation requires the court to
examine the content of the words-a speech against military operations to determine whether they
violate the policy of the law-the law is not content neutral.
203. /d. at 878. In Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., Justice Scalia explained his Smith opinion.
Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 579 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). He characterized
Smith as holding "that general laws not specifically targeted at religious practices did not require
heightened First Amendment scrutiny even though they diminished some people's ability to
practice their religion." /d.
204. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 901 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
205. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,531 (1993).
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The Religious Freedom Restoration Act

Problems with immunizing generally applicable laws from First Amendment free exercise scrutiny spawned a political solution in the United States.
Mainstream religions perceived Smith to be an attack on religious freedom and
combined with new and splinter groups to lobby for legislative protection of their
interests.ns They believed that Smith devalued religious acts and threatened their
own practices. 207 Prior decisions, which had protected pacifists that refused to
make weapons and Sabbatarians that refused to work on Saturday, now appeared
vulnerable.n Congress responded to these concerns with The Religious Freedom Restoration Act,YJ which attempted to restore the prior law by requiring a
compelling interest to justify any substantial burden on religion imposed by the
state. 210
Recently, in City of Boerne v. Flores, 211 the Supreme Court invalidated the
212
Act.
The majority held that Congress lacks power to affect the substance of a
constitutional right, and that Congress went beyond what was appropriate as a
remedy. 213 The three dissenters, Justices Sandra Day GConnor, Stephen Breyer,
and David Souter objected to the majority's failure to reconsider the correctness
of Smith, and would have set the case for reargument. 214 Despite the decision in
Boerne, the political response may some day inspire the Supreme Court to revise
its judicial views on religion, recognizing that immunity from scrutiny is not a
healthy response to any law affecting basic human rights. 215

B. Establishment of Religion
Unlike Australia, the United States Supreme Court refused to limit its
establishment clause analysis to the purpose of the action. In Everson v. Board of
Education, 2•6 the Supreme Court initially wrote of the "wall between church and
206. Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 883, 895-96 (1994).
7JJ7. /d. at 897.
208. See generally Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (stating that an individual
was entitled to unemployment benefits when he quit for religious reasons after learning that the
steel which he was engaged in producing was used for producing armaments); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that Sabbatarian was entitled to unemployment benefits when fired
for refusing to work on Saturday).
'21.1J. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
210. /d. § 2000bb(b)(l).
211. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
212 /d. at 2172.
213. /d.
214. /d. at 2186 (Souter, J., dissenting).
215. See David Bogen, Generally Applicable Laws and the First Amendmen~ 26 Sw. U. L.
REV. 201,204 {1997).
216. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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state." 217 In School District v. Schempp,2 18 the Supreme Court said "to withstand
the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. " 219 The
Supreme Court has also expressed concerns with laws whose administration
entangled the government with religion. In Lemon v. Kurtzman,m the Court
announced a three-part test that required challenged legislation to: 1) have a
secular legislative purpose; 2) have a principal or primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; and 3) not foster an excessive government
entanglement with religion.22t
While "purpose" rears its head in Lemon, it is only a portion of that test.
The primary effect of the law is a separate part of the test, and the law's effect,
rather than purpose, is more likely to cause it to run afoul of the Establishment
Clause. When construing a statute, a court often looks to the purpose of a law to
determine what effect they should give it. 222 When determining whether the
law's purpose is legitimate, the analysis is reversed; the Court uses the law's
effect to determine its purpose.
The "purpose" of legislation is not the conflicting desires of those who
voted for it, but instead the end which it serves. Under normal circumstances, the
statute's objective is to achieve an effect. Laws, however, have multiple effects.
"Purpose" analysis distinguishes among those effects to select some as objectives
and others as incidental consequences. It is essentially a fictional notion derived
from the possible aims of legislation, as determined by its likely effects and
actual effects, and refined by consideration of the normal significance of those
effects and alternative means to produce them.223 Although the existence of a
secular effect opens up the possibility of a secular purpose for a law, the primary
or principal effect of a law is the best evidence of its purpose. To the extent that
"purpose" contains a fictional intent notion, a court might find a secular purpose
despite a primary religious effect, but the primary effect test prevents the court
from resting on a fiction. At the same time, the Lemon test does not help much in
the actual determination of purpose or in determining whether an effect is
"principal or primary" or subsidiary and secondary. 224

217. /d. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)) (internal quotes
omitted).
218. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
219. /d. at 222.
220. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
221. /d. at 612-13.
222. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rule or
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 400 (1950).
223. The purpose of a statute will be one or more of its likely or actual effects. Effects that
are normally undesirable, such as expense, will not usually be the law's objective. Similarly, beneficial effects may be excluded from the purpose where they could be achieved more easily by
alternative means onhey appear minor in comparison with other benefits of the law. Purpose is
even more complex than this quick reference to important factors suggests and is the subject of rich
literature. /d. at 400-01.
224. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
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In Agostini v. Felton, 225 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Lemon test while
providing evidence of problems in its application. 226 The Supreme Court
reversed a prior decisiofi227 and permitted New York to send public school
teachers into parochial schools to provide remedial education.228 Just.ice
O'Connor's majority opinion said that while the Supreme Court's general principles had not changed, it had changed its understanding of the criteria used to
assess whether aid to religion has an impermissible effect. 229 Justice O'Connor
wrote that the Supreme Court no longer followed a presumption that placement
of public employees in parochial schools inevitably leads to state-sponsored
indoctrination or constitutes a symbolic union between government and
religion. 230 Justice O'Connor stated that the "entanglement" test from Lemon
was simply an aspect of the inquiry into a statute's effect to advance or inhibit
religion. 231 The key issue for the majority was whether the program had the
effect of advancing religion, and they concluded that the program "does not
result in governmental indoctrination; define its recipients by reference to
religion; or create an excessive entanglement.''232
Justice O'Connor also said that the program could not be reasonably
viewed as an endorsement of religion.233 The endorsement test permits the
225. Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
226. /d. at 2016-19.
227. /d. at 2019 (overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 437 U.S. 402 (1985)).
228. /d. at 2018-19.
229. /d. at 2010.
230. /d.
231. /d. at 2015.
232 /d. at 2016.
233. /d. The endorsement test identified by Justice O'Connor has received increasing .
support. See Capitol Square R~view & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995) (holding
that the Board could not prohibit a private group from placing a cross in a location used as a public
forum). Justice O'Connor stated:
[W]hen the reasonable observer would view a government practice as
endorsing religion, I believe it is our duty to hold the practice invalid ....
Governmental intent cannot control, and not all state policies are permissible
under the Religion Clauses simply because they are neutral in form.
Where the government's operation of. a public forum has the effect of
endorsing religion, even if the governmental actor neither intends nor actively
encourages that result, ... the Establishment Clause is violated.
!d. at 2454 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
Justices Souter and Breyer joined O'Connor's opinion in Capital Square, and Justice Stevens seemed to adopt an endorsement test as well. Justice Stevens stated, "if a reasonable person
could perceive a government endorsement of religion from a private display, then the State may not
allow its property to be used as a forum for that display." /d. at 2466 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The
Justices differed on whether the determination of endorsement should be governed by the standard
of a reasonable observer with specific knowledge of the facts surrounding the action and
community context or by a reasonable person who might have Jess knowledge of the facts.
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Supreme Court to say that it is applying essentially objective tests rather than
seeking to divine "intent" or "purpose." Nevertheless, the primary objective of a
government action that appears to endorse religion is likely to support that religion, and a government action whose objective is to support religion will appear to
endorse it. Thus, under this test, the Supreme Court avoids the briar patch of
governmental intent, while assuring that laws whose objective is to establish
religion will fall.
Justice Souter dissented in Agostini on the grounds that the program
directly subsidized religion and could reasonably be viewed as an
endorsement. 234 Four justices agreed in the dissent that the program breached the
principle that the state cannot provide direct and substantial aid to religious
institutions even if the criteria for such aid is not religious. 235
While the generally applicable law is not exempt from establishment clause
analysis, it will rarely fail under the current majority's test. Where the law does
not distinguish religion from secular matters, it is unlikely the government will
appear to be endorsing religion. The law is likely to have a secular purpose and
affect religion only incidentally. Nevertheless, it remains theoretically possible
for a litigant to persuade the Supreme Court that the generality of the law was a
mask for supporting religion. The unmasking would demonstrate both religious
purpose and endorsement.

C. Freedom of Speech
The question of justification for exempting generally applicable laws from
First Amendment scrutiny may soon apply to controversies regarding the freedom of speech, as well as, the free exercise of religion. The law is currently in a
state of confusion, but two cases suggest that free exercise analysis may soon be
applied to free speech.
1.

The Conflict in the Cases on Generally Applicable Laws

In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, /nc.;m Glen Theatre, the Kitty Kat Lounge, and
dancers Darlene Miller and Gayle Sutro challenged a state law that forbade public nudity. m Chief Justice Rehnquist' s plurality opinion began by stating that
nude dancing was an expression protected by the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of speech.238 Eight of the Justices applied a four-part test to determine
whether the state law was constitutional: 1) is the law within the constitutional
power of government; 2) does the law further an important or substantial governmental interest; 3) is the governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of
expression; and 4) is the incidental restriction on the alleged First Amendment

234. Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. at 2019-22 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens and Ginsburg,
JJ., dissenting).
235. /d. at 2022-25 (Souter, J., joined by Breyer, Ginsburg, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
236. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
237. /d. at 562-63.
238. /d. at 565-66.
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freedoms no greater than what is essential to the furtherance of that interest.239
The justices applying this level of scrutiny, which carefully analyzed the interests
involved, split evenly on the outcome. Justice Scalia, who cast the deciding vote,
argued that dancing was conduct, not speech, and that the appropriate inquiry
was whether the suppression of the expressive aspect of that conduct was the
object of the law.2AO In this respect, Justice Scalia applied Smith's principle that a
neutral law of general applicability was constitutional. 241
The test used by the eight Justices in Barnes may be equivalent to the
"reasonably proportionate" standard evoked in Australian cases.242 Justice Lewis
Powell used the idea of proportionality in examining the constitutionality of
regulating nonrnisleading lawyer advertising. 243 "Even when a communication is
not misleading, the State retains some authority to regulate. But the State must
assert a substantial interest and the interference with speech must be in proportion to the interest served."244 Justice Scalia later cited Justice Powell's statement
when Scalia argued that the requirement that a regulation not "burden
substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government's
legitimate interests"24S did not require a showing that the law was the least
restrictive alternative, but only that it was proportional:
What our decisions require is a "'fit' between the legislature's ends
and the means chosen to accomplish those ends," ... - a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single
best disposition but one whose scope is "in proportion to the interest
served," ... that employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but, as
we have put it in the other contexts discussed above, a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective. Within those bounds we leave it to
governmental decisionmakers to judge what manner of regulation may best
be employed. 246

In another recent case, Justice O'Connor said the requ~rement that laws
regulating commercial speech can be no more extensive "than is necessary" to
239. /d. at 567 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by O'Connor and Kennedy, JJ.). Justice Souter
agreed in the four-part analysis. /d. at 582 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice White followed the
same analysis. See id. al. 590 (White, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.,
dissenting).
2AO. /d. at 576-79 (Scalia, J., concurring).
241. /d. at 577-78.
242 See supra notes 157-71 and accompanying text.
243. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203-04 (1982) (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,563-64 (1980)).
244. /d. at 203.
245. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 478 (1989) (quoting from Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)).
246. /d. at 480 (citations omitted).
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serve the governmental interest required that the law be proportionate.247
"[T]here must be a fit between the legislature's goal and method, 'a fit that is not
necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best
disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served. "' 248
Justice O'Connor elaborated on the proportionality test used for commercial speech, stating that the fit between means and ends must be narrowly tailored
and the scope of the restriction on speech must be reasonably targeted to address
the harm intended to be regulated. 249 The regulation must carefully calculate the
costs and benefits associated with the burden on speech imposed by its prohibition; less burdensome alternatives to reach the stated goal indicate the fit between
means and ends may be too imprecise.~ If alternative channels permit communication of the restrictive speech, the regulation is more likely to be considered
reasonable. 251
Justice Scalia urged a very deferential view toward the application of the
proportionality standard in a variety of contexts. Justice Scalia specifically
pointed to the Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto
Rico 252 decision as an example of the relevant degree of deference.253 The
Supreme Court has since rejected Posadas in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
lsland, 254 requiring a closer look at the legislation and whether it is sufficiently
narrowly tailored.255
It is not clear whether the Supreme Court will closely scrutinize and apply
the concept of proportionality to generally applicable laws. Three days after its
decision in Barnes, the Supreme Court decided Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 256
saying that a generally applicable law does not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement agairist the press has incidental effects on its
ability to get and report the news. 257 Instead of nude dancing, Cohen involved
the publication of significant information about a political campaign.258 After the
Minneapolis Star agreed not to reveal his identity, Daniel Cohen, an employee of
the Republican candidate for governor, gave the newspaper copies of public records that showed that the Democratic candidate for lieutenant governor had been
charged with unlawful assembly and had been convicted of petty theft. 259 When
the paper discovered that the unlawful assembly charges concerned a protest over
failure to hire minorities, and that the theft was a failure to pay for six dollars of
'lA1.
Trustees v.
'lAS.
'lA9.

250.
251.
252
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1521 (1996) (quoting Board of
Fox, 492 U.S. at 480.
·
/d.
/d. (citing Aorida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2380-81 (1995)).
/d. (citing Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410,417 (1993)).
/d.
Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. at 1522.
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
ld. at 1510-14.
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
/d. at 669.
/d. at 665-66.
/d. at 665.
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sewing materials on leaving a store during a period when the candidate had been
under a great emotional strain, the paper revealed that Cohen had given them the
records.2ffi Not surprisingly, this revelation embarrassed Cohen's employer and
Cohen was subsequently fired. 2151 Cohen responded by suing the Minneapolis
Star. 2152 The newspaper contended that its decision to identify Cohen was protected by the First Amendment.263 The Supreme Court held that Cohen might
pursue a promissory estoppel action, because promissory estoppel was a rule of
general application and the application to speech here was not a product of governmental choice of forbidden speech, but a result of the defendant's own
promise. 264
Justice Anthony Kennedy later noted the conflicting rationales of Cohen
and Barnes and stated that ''the enforcement of a generally applicable law may or
may not be subject to heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment. " 2155
2.

The Relationship of American Indecision to Australia

The freedom of political discussion implied from the principle of representative government found in the Australian Constitution is unlikely to apply to
topless dancing in King's Cross, but it could well apply to a journalist's revelation of a source for information about a political candidate in an election. Chief
Justice Mason cited Cohen in his opinion in ACTV,2156 noting that "in the United
States, despite the First Amendment, the media is subject to laws of general
application. "1ST
Both Australian and American judges have distinguished between laws
targeted at ideas and laws that are content-neutral in regulating the means of
260. /d. at 665-66.
261. /d. at 666.
262 /d. at 665.
263. /d. at 668.
264. /d. at 669-71.
265. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 640 (1994). That same term Chief
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Madsen v. Women's Health Center reviewed an injunction against
abortion pickets in which he stated:
If this were a content-neutral, generally applicable statute, instead of an
injunctive order, its constitutionality would be assessed under the standard set
forth in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, and similar cases. Given that the forum
around the clinic is a traditional public forum, we would determine whether the
time, place and manner regulations were "narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest."
Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr, 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2524 (1994) (citations omitted). But this
0 'Brien- like standard is applied to regulations of the public forum, which is quite different than the
statute that is not so confined.
266. Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1992) 177 C.L.R.
106, 143 (Mason, C.J.).
267. /d.
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expression, noting that the former require a higher degree of justification than the
latter.268 American Courts have gone further with the suggestion in Cohen that
the content-neutral law that is of general application requires no justification at
all.2eJ The only generally applicable laws challenged in Australia as violations of
the implied freedom of political communication were upheld in opinions that
found them appropriate and adapted to serve legitimate purposes, a test that was
not thoroughly explored.vo The High Court, therefore, remains free to decide
what degree of scrutiny should be given neutral laws of general application for
compatibility with the implied freedom of political discussion.

IV. GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAWS
The neutral law of general applicability has two characteristics that make it
arguably immune from First Amendment concerns. The first is that it affects
primarily noncommunicative secular behavior. Such a law is normally justified
by an interest unrelated to the suppression of communication or religion. In other
words, it carries prima facie indicia of a legitimate government concern.
The second characteristic of the neutral law of general applicability follows
from the first. Since the law's object is, on its face, unrelated to religion or
expression, any impact on religion or communication appears to be incidental to
another purpose.
A. The Case for Generally Applicable Laws

The contention that these characteristics of the neutral law of general
applicability immunize it from scrutiny under the First Amendment depends on
one of two propositions. Either the generality proves that the social interest the
law serves outweighs the individual's interest in religion or expression, or
freedom is defined in terms of governmental behavior rather than the impact on
the individual.
Cqntent-neutrality and general applicability do not indicate the importance
of the underlying social interest justifying the law, which may be anything from
protecting grass to preventing the collapse of western civilization (assuming
those two are different). If all content-neutral laws of general applicability are
consistent with the free exercise of religion and freedom of speech, the slightest
social interest must outweigh the injury done to religious exercise or speech.
That will be true only if the generality of the law assures that the injury to the
exercise of religion or freedom of speech is slight. Although the affected individual would disagree, it can be argued that society's interest in free religious
exercise or free expression is not significantly impaired by the general law. People are more likely to be hurt when someone is out to get them. Where only
incidental impacts on religious exercise or expression are permitted, no one need
268. See for example, the opinions of Justices Mason, McHugh, Deane, and Toohey in
Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v. Wills (Austl. 1992) 177 C.L.R. 1.
UJ9. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. at 669.
270. See, e.g., Langer v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1997) 134 A.L.R. 400, 405-06 (Brennan,
C.J.).
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fear that disagreement with their beliefs or views will result in laws against them.
The particular law will not discourage speech or religious acts beyond its immediate application. The law does not affect the quality of free exercise of religion
for society despite its impact on individual worshippers.
Alternatively, the free exercise of religion may be defined in terms of freedom from improper governmental action. If religious exercise is behavior
impelled by religious belief, the free exercise of religion may be defined as the
absence of restrictions based on disapproval of that belief. Disapproval or
disagreement with the belief is not a legitimate basis for governmental action.
Under this definition of freedom, as long as the impact on religious exercise is
purely incidental, there is no prohibition of free exercise.
This discussion suggests that the decision of the United States Supreme
Court to exempt laws of general applicability from scrutiny is prompted by the
same concern for the purpose of the law that marks the Australian High Court's
approach in religion cases and is visible in its decisions on the implied freedom
of political discussion.
There are two major arguments in favor of the view that laws of general
application do not prohibit the free exercise of religion. First, that doctrine satisfies the demand for formal equality between believers and nonbelievers, the
concern for governmental neutrality between differing views. Second, it creates
an objective standard that avoids the appearance of political decisions.
Challenges to the impact of laws of general application on particular religious exercises usually call for an exemption from the operation of the law for the
believer. Such an exemption raises issues of formal equality; if we seek religious
neutrality, society should not prefer belief to disbelief and it should not privilege
the believer to engage in conduct that the nonbeliever cannot pursue. The concern for neutrality is underscored by the constitutional prohibitions on
establishing religion. While there are appropriate responses to this view, it
remains a powerful ground to support the position of the Supreme Court.
Further, because no one suggests an absolute immunity for religious exercise, the alternative to exempting laws of general application is to balance the
value of the religious exercise against the values served by the conflicting law.
Such judicial weighing exposes the Justices to criticism for arbitrary and subjective decisions. Justices, as closely attuned definitionally as Justices Deane and
Toohey, parted over migration agent registration in Cunliffe.V 1 United States
Supreme Court Justices disagreed on the strength of the respective interests in
Smith. m Justice Scalia stated in Smith:
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political
process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that
are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic
government must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law
271. See Cunliffe v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1994) 182 C.L.R. 274.
272. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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unto itsel{ or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws
against the centrality of all religious beliefs. m

B. The Weaknesses of Immunity for Generally Applicable Laws

The "talismanic" immunity of the law of general application, however,
does not comport with the reasons offered for it. The law may be prima facie
legiti~ate, but a closer look can reveal that the law violates the premises of free
exercise.
Once a doctrine of immunity is established, clever draftsman will invoke it.
Even laws of general applicability are susceptible to pretextual use. If one seeks
to injure the Native American church, a general proscription of the use of hallucinogens, including peyote, will do it. It may be using an awkward instrument to
accomplish the goal, like draining the lake to catch a bass, but it will be used if
the Supreme Court allows. The awkwardness of using laws of general applicability to accomplisQ a targeted result may justify a prima facie assumption that no
improper purpose was involved, but it does not justify ignoring the possibility
under any theory of freedom of religion.
The exemption for laws of general application, because their impact on
religion is incidental, overlooks the potential of a segmented analysis. Even
though the law was justified on a neutral basis, it could have provided an exemption for applications to religious exercise. The failure to provide an exemption
may have been the product of antipathy to that religion. For example, the denial
of unemployment payments to an individual that refuses work is a rule of general
application, but pay is granted to some persons where the refusal to work is
justified. The failure to acknowledge religion as a sufficient justification for
refusal to work may flow from a disregard for- the importance of religion to the
individual. Allowing unemployment pay where religious principles cause the
refusal to work has no significant effect on the unemployment compensation
system's operation. Where the interest of the state in applying a general law to
religion is a weak one, the possibility that the application is a result of forbidden
purpose is strong.
Accepting the idea that the objective of the law is crucial to its constitutionality, no law should be immune from review for compatibility with the
Constitution. General applicability alone does not negate the possibility of an
impermissible objective. The opinions of the Justices in the Australian freedom
of political discussion cases have demonstrated the utility of a test of
proportionality to assure that the impact of a law on speech (and religion) is
entirely incidental and necessary to the accomplishment of a legitimate purpose.
But proportionality alone will not resolve all questions, since the Court may differ on whether the law is proportional. Given the risk to fundamental values, the
Court should scrutinize challenged laws with care rather than deferring to the
surface plausibility of the state's asserted justification.

'2:13. !d. at 890.
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V. CONCLUSION

The neutrality and general applicability of a law serves as an indicia that it
is compatible with the free exercise of religion and freedom of speech, but it is
not a guarantee of consistency even if those human rights are viewed in terms of
the legitimate and illegitimate purposes of government. Unless we demand
strong reasons for restrictions that apply to religion and speech, as well as to
other matters, we may find our freedoms wane.
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